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THESIS

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A GENERAL MODEL

by

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ABSTRACT

After three decades of intense United States international involvement, a complex community of semi-autonomous governmental agencies has evolved to plan, implement and operate America's foreign affairs. The past ten years have seen several attempts to unify policymaking machinery. This thesis proposes a general model for Presidential foreign policymaking through the Department of State. Historical aspects of the problem are briefly described, followed by an analysis of the current CASP and PARA approaches to foreign affairs planning, decisionmaking, resource management and review. The author then proposes a conceptual model based on essential characteristics of foreign affairs policymaking, which are fashioned into a dynamic four-stage system for substantive management. The thesis concludes with consideration of the measurement of effectiveness as a basis for choosing policies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF CHARTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AFSA	American Foreign Service Association
AID	Agency for International Development
AF	Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
ARA	Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
CASP	Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CCPS	Comprehensive Country Programming System
CT	Country Team
DPRC	Defense Programs Review Committee, NSC
EA	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EUR	Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
FAPS	Foreign Affairs Programming System
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
IG	Interdepartmental Group, NSC
IRG	Interdepartmental Regional Group (NSAM-341)
JFSOC	Junior Foreign Service Officers' Club
MEG	Management Evaluation Group
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NSA	National Security Affairs
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
PARA	Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation

PPBS	Planning Programming Budgeting System
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIG	Senior Interdepartmental Group (NSAM-341)
S/PC	Secretariat Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
SRG	Senior Review Group, NSC
WSAG	Washington Special Actions Group, NSC

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The idea for a thesis on how modern management concepts and analytical methods might best be applied to the conduct of American foreign policy first came to the author when he was an intern in the Office of the Secretary of State. While a candidate for advanced degrees in both public administration and operations research, he had the opportunity to investigate at close hand the extent to which systems management, analytical decisionmaking and program budgeting were being used in the Department of State. As a result of that experience,[1] this researcher decided that such a thesis could be a useful contribution to the Department's efforts at management reform. The thesis should offer a general model for (1) the substantive management of foreign policy and (2) the system for its design, development and control. This type of framework is necessary, in the author's opinion, before others can successfully introduce specific analytical methodologies, such as the current "Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation" approach.[2]

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and evaluate current concepts of policy formulation and analysis, determine what structural characteristics are essential to policymaking in foreign affairs, and

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[1]The writer served as a member of the Secretary's Planning and Coordination Staff in May and June of 1971, working primarily on an assessment of the PARA (Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation) system used by regional bureaus. This internship was followed by return visits in November 1971 and January 1972 as a consultant to the newly formed Methods and Systems Staff.

[2]The PARA system is discussed in detail in Chapter II.

develop these characteristics into a general model of a proposed policymaking process. The writer begins by defining a number of terms used throughout the thesis. He then presents the assumptions underlying the analysis of policy or substantive management issues and the design of a general model. The first chapter includes sufficient background and history necessary for a layman to understand the problem of management reform in the Department. It is admitted, however, that the author is writing primarily for persons engaged in designing and developing policy analysis and resource allocation methods at the Department of State as well as his colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School who are studying the application of operations research and systems analysis to national security affairs and public policymaking generally.

The second chapter examines current concepts of policy analysis and describes several attempts at "programming" foreign affairs. Primary attention is given the PARA (Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation) system concept and the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) methodology. The state-of-the-art is examined and major strengths and short-comings determined.

Chapter III presents those characteristics the writer considers essential to any desirable policymaking process for the conduct of America's foreign affairs. Seven essential characteristics of a desirable policymaking system are detailed.

Chapter IV is in three parts. In the first the writer proposes a model for the policymaking process. This is followed by critique relating the model to the existing environment. The third part addresses how public officials may measure policy effectiveness in foreign affairs applications.

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS

There are a number of terms used throughout this presentation which require precise definition, because too much ambiguity is attached to them in everyday usage. These terms will be defined here for the purpose of this thesis.

Policy: An understanding by members of a group that makes the actions of each member more predictable to other members. Policy is a guide for making decisions.[3]

Policy Decision: A decision that sets a precedent and provides some guide for decisionmaking in the future.[4]

Policymaking: The making of policy decisions.

Goals: Desired conditions that are achievable only in an extended time frame, that is, five years or more.

Objectives: Conditions that are specific milestones in the attainment of goals and are achievable in the short term, e.g., one or two years.

Program: An explicit set of steps to be taken in order to achieve all or part of an objective.[5]

Operations: Constrained, routinized set of tasks that are performed in carrying-out an established program.

Planning: The process by which a manager looks to the future and discovers alternative courses (goals, objectives, programs) open to him.[6]

Implementation: The process of selecting preferred programs; developing, staffing and initiating their activities, and carrying them to the point when they can be operated routinely.

Foreign Affairs Community: Those departments, agencies, bureaus and other elements of the U.S. Government engaged in the conduct of foreign policy or international activities. The principal

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[3] Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall) 1964, pp. 40-41.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 63.

[6] Ibid., p. 60.

bodies in this "community" are: the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Agency for International Development; the U.S. Information Agency; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Peace Corps.

Functional Fields: Specialized fields that a Foreign Service Officer may enter: political-military, economic-commercial, intelligence and research, consular or administrative.

Substantive Fields: The two most prestigious and generalist fields of political and general economic affairs are considered the policy generating or "substantive" areas by most FSOs.[7]

Systems Analysis: A systematic approach to helping a decisionmaker choose among courses of action by investigating his full problem, searching out objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the light of their consequences; it employs an appropriate framework--in so far as possible analytic--to bring expert judgment and intuition to bear on the problem.[8]

C. ASSUMPTIONS

There are assumptions underlying the analysis and conclusions contained in this thesis. The writer has identified the following:

1. The scope of foreign affairs and its policymaking is the whole of the U.S. Government's international activities, except for the unified commands and other Presidentially excluded military activities.

2. The President, acting through his Secretary of State, should direct, supervise and control all of the U.S. Government's foreign affairs.

3. The U.S. Government's foreign affairs and its policymaking are composed of numerous overlapping, yet independent, systems which need to be integrated centrally; such system integration requires management by the Secretary of State of policy formulation and resource allocation, as well as his supervision of implementation and control of operations.

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[7] John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, (Princeton: The Princeton University Press) 1969, p. 141.

[8] E. S. Quade, "Systems Analysis and Policy Planning," in E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher, eds., Systems Analysis and Policy Planning (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation) 1968, p. 2.

4. The management of foreign affairs, in both substantive stages and system design, would benefit substantially from the use of systematic analysis, including quantitative and economic reasoning.

D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. The Context

When a notable former Secretary of State feels compelled to write that "...the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily declined,"[9] the writer believes that an examination of the institution, and the environment in which it operates, is in order.

It is the writer's belief that the late Secretary's assessment is accurate, and that much of the difficulty stems from continued efforts to employ nineteenth-century methods of diplomacy and foreign affairs management to a world situation that has far outdistanced these methods. With the advent of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the character of U.S. foreign relations changed from traditional isolationism to deep involvement in world affairs; yet the

> ...Body of professional diplomats, the Foreign Service Officer corps, remained essentially unchanged. It manned none of the new functions...it would have been impossible for it to do so in such a short time with its normal method of recruitment from the bottom.[10]

Twenty-five years later, we are in the midst of a period which John Harr describes as "revolutionary" in world affairs, one in which "Crises are endemic."[11] Professor Charles McClelland hypothesizes

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[9] Dean Acheson, "The Eclipse of the State Department," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 593.

[10] Harr, op. cit., p. 21.

[11] Ibid., pp. 28, 31.

that the demands for more effective handling of U.S. foreign relations is accentuated by burgeoning domestic difficulties, which he attributes to "accelerating modernization."

> Despite the accumulation of wealth and power, all the modernized countries and not only the United States, have been finding that the recent growth in the size, scope and complexity of their domestic activities has occurred at a faster rate than the increases in collective organizational ability to steer these activities in desired directions. Standard procedures for handling many problems in society appear to have become too slow, too fragmented, and too expensive....Accompanying these effects is an increase in a phenomenon that should be called "Societal Metabolism"--the more modernized societies simply live more and faster than the less modernized societies. The most modernized societies encounter so many emergency situations that government by crisis threatens to become a permanent condition.[12]

Professor McClelland goes on to say that "In foreign affairs the basic needs are to reduce the saliency of international politics and to maximize efforts to avert confrontations and crises and to attenuate conflicts."[13]

The demands of the current environment on policymaking are summarized by Yehezkel Dror, one of the foremost proponents of a new discipline of "policy science."

> One conclusion seems inescapable: the problems faced even now by modern society, to say nothing of the problems scientific progress and social evolution will raise in the foreseeable future, require very high-quality public policymaking for even minimally satisfactory solutions."[14]

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[12] Charles A. McClelland, et. al. "The Management and Analysis of International Event Data: A Computerized System for Monitoring and Projecting Event Flows," report prepared for ARPA/ONR contract #N00014-67-A-0269-0004, Sept. 1971, pp. 11-12.

[13] Ibid., p. 13.

[14] Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company) 1968, p. 6.

It is the author's belief that the situation described above places the U.S. President in the position of great need for an effective, responsive foreign affairs bureaucracy."'The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.'"[15] Over the past decade, three presidents have consistently tried to gain the necessary responsiveness from the foreign affairs community, and have encouraged the Department of State to take charge and coordinate the many agencies' efforts.[16] It is the writer's opinion that failure in these efforts has forced the President to adopt the less-desirable alternative of surrounding himself with a range of advisors and experts, assembled in groups compact enough to give the desired responsiveness. The writer recognizes the current National Security Council (NSC) as the most advanced of such presidential advisory systems, which, as organized today, institutionalizes the President's alternative to Departmental leadership and multi-agency participative management.

2. The Nixon NSC

In order to assess the role, power and influence of the Department of State today, vis a vis the NSC apparatus, the reader should compare both institutions over time. President Eisenhower, who created a most elaborate NSC system, relied primarily on his Secretary of State

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[15] Acheson, op. cit.

[16] Harr, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

for the direction of foreign affairs while delegating to the Under Secretary operational coordination.[17] President Kennedy virtually disassembled the NSC system, retaining the Office of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (NSA) as a personal staff.[18] He exhorted the Secretary of State to take charge of the foreign affairs community, but gave little more executive attention to the matter.[19] President Johnson continued using the Office of Assistant to the President for NSA in the same manner, but sought even more energetically ways for the Secretary of State and the Department to exercise hegemony over the semi-autonomous foreign affairs agencies.[20] Under Johnson's direction, General Maxwell D. Taylor drafted NSAM-341 (National Security Action Memorandum), which devised a policy review structure that weighed heavily in State's favor; but the Department did not seize the opportunity presented,[21] and the result, in the author's opinion, was the revised NSC.

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[17] Robert Cutler, "The National Security Council Under President Eisenhower," in Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers) 1965, pp. 111-139.

[18] Good accounts of the Kennedy approach to foreign policy management may be found in: Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy.

[19] Ibid., pp. 380-387.

[20] Harr, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

[21] The two most comprehensive accounts of the Johnson administration efforts to restructure the foreign affairs community are found in: John Franklin Compbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory; and Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership.

On February 7, 1969 in a formal White House announcement, the revised structure, role and staff of the NSC were outlined.[22] This instruction rescinded the Johnson system for high level policy review, outlined in NSAM-341 (4 March 1966).

The Senior Interdepartmental Group/Interdepartmental Regional Group hierarchy was replaced with an organization tightly controlled by the new Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, and geared to support exactly that advisory capacity.

The original formal structure provided for two standing committees: the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Under Secretary of State and tasked with handling primarily operational matters; and the NSC Senior Review Group (SRG), chaired by Henry Kissinger and tasked with assigning and giving formal approval to all NSC study memoranda. Also in the formal structure are six Interdepartmental Groups (IG's, formerly Interdepartmental Regional Groups under NSAM-341), one for each of the State Department's five geographic regions and one for political-military affairs, each chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State.

Great flexibility is given to the system through the provision for NSC Ad Hoc Groups, which may be appointed by the President to handle specific issues, including those crossing regional bounds. Some of the ad hoc groups appear to have transcended the standing committees in importance. The current situation shows five ad hoc groups, with four apparantly taking permanent status at the level of the Senior Review

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[22] Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, committee print, "The National Security Council: new Role and Structure," 7 February 1969.

Group.[23] These five are: (1) the Verification Panel, charged with providing the sensitive high-priority analysis for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); (2) the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), chaired by Kissinger and tasked with providing the command and control function necessary in cases of sudden international crises or national emergencies; (3) the Vietnam Special Studies Group, chaired by a Kissinger staff senior analyst who insures that no White House questions regarding Vietnam are left unanswered; (4) the Defense Programs Review Committee, chaired by Kissinger and designated to align defense expenditures with foreign policy objectives; and (5) the newest element added in November 1971, the Intelligence Committee, chaired again by Kissinger to coordinate efforts among the numerous separate elements of the intelligence community. To assist Dr. Kissinger, there are in excess of 120 professionals and administrative people who provide staff for regional and functional tasks, program analysis and net assessment.

From the above description, it would appear to the writer that little U.S. foreign policymaking machinery is left unsupervised by the NSC, and much of it is incorporated within its structure. The major tool at the disposal of the NSC is the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM),[24] an instruction soliciting a detailed written response to a specified set of study questions, the product of which must be approved by the appropriate IG and then the SRG or other designated comparable

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[23] John Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," Foreign Policy, No. 5, Winter 71-72, pp. 7-9.

[24] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

body before being submitted to the President. "Harvard professor that he is, he [Kissinger] made the bureaucrats write theses, and proved to be a tough grader. He rated many of the early NSC studies no better than 'C'--barely passing."[25]

The requirement for detail review of each NSSM and the option to return those found unacceptable for reworking are considered by the writer to be inherent strengths of the current NSC system; it attempts to locate all feasible options available in a particular policy issue. Concomitant with these strengths are two of the major weaknesses the writer sees in the current approach, the generation of a massive volume of paper and the broad range of issues given one man and his relatively small staff to monitor, develop options and coordinate actions.

> The need would seem rather to go beyond this, to have other officials at key places in the foreign affairs government who are responsive to the President's priorities....And this is precisely what the Nixon system has failed to do. It has not built centers of strength responsive to the President in other parts of the foreign affairs government.[26]

In the writer's opinion, the breadth and depth of a man's interests cannot be so wide and uniform that he concentrates on every issue with the same interest and competance. One result of the existing situation is that the key man's biases have already been applied to the information flow, before the Chief Executive is allowed to apply his own. In many ways the present NSC system is the most efficient advisory apparatus ever available to a President; yet there are ways in which it is also the most limiting.

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[25] Ibid., p. 24.

[26] I. M. Destler, "Can One Man Do?" Foreign Policy, No. 5, Winter 71-72, p. 33.

3. The AFSA Coup

For eight years under President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, the prevailing attitude about the management of foreign affairs in the Department of State had been quite reactionary at best. Efforts were directed toward exorcising every operational and implementive facet of foreign affairs.[27] The Department was to concentrate on "policy," leaving the conduct of operations to others. "Others" sprang up in abundance, with nearly 50 governmental entities not only involved in foreign affairs by 1961, but placing elements abroad.[28] At the "Bay of Pigs" the Kennedy administration learned painfully but quickly the problems of coordinating and controlling disparate agencies involved in carrying-out the foreign policy activities of the United States.[29] The reaction was swift; the President by Executive Order,[30] letters[31] and admonitions asked the Department and Foreign Service to take back the direction and supervision of America's foreign affairs. The management revolution came to Washington, swept through the Pentagon, but in the author's opinion stalled at the Department of State.

The junior FSO entering the Department over the past decade was a new breed, one that questioned the traditional values and methods of the FOreign Service, and was concerned that his chosen profession was

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[27] Mosher and Harr, op. cit., p. 17.

[28] Ibid., pp. 12-16.

[29] Schlesinger, op. cit.

[30] Executive Order abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 19 February 1961.

[31] Kennedy letter to the ambassadors, 29 May 1961, affirming their control over all agencies in their countries.

increasingly criticized as being archaic.[32] In 1966 many of the younger officers began to examine some of these problems through a group called the Junior Foreign Service Officer's Club. Dubbed the "young Turks," their presence soon became known, and their efforts and ideas started to gain support from some of the middle-grade and senior officers in the Department.[33]

In 1967, the JFSOC joined forces with a group of activist middle-grade FSO's, and staged what has come to be known as the "AFSA coup." The American Foreign Service Association, a bulwark of traditionalism, became the target of a well-planned political campaign that found its way into every Foreign Service post around the world. The result was an overwhelming victory for the activists and their slate of candidates, transforming AFSA into the focal point for the progressive movement in the Foreign Service.[34]

Immediately following their election in the fall of 1967, the Board of Directors of AFSA mobilized a study group composed of eight subcommittees assigned to specific projects. The subjects ranged from personnel and career management problems to the broader area of foreign affairs management, including a study of State Department "Organization and Leadership: and an investigation of possible applications of "Technology and Systems Analysis."[35] Many of the recommendations stated in

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[32] Harr, op. cit., pp. 267-286.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Mosher and Harr, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

[35] Ibid., p. 194.

the final AFSA report[36] were reaffirmations of the results of earlier studies directed by Christian Herter and Charles J. Hitch; others however, were radical departures from the traditional role and concepts long held in the Foreign Service. Some of these recommendations and comments were:

> ...appointment of a "general manager" as number three officer, to be called either Executive Under Secretary or Permanent Under Secretary.
>
> All substantive officers should acquire a general understanding of computer operations and systems analysis techniques....
>
> A few substantive officers should be extensively trained in these techniques so that they can serve as liaison between the outside experts who have had little experience in foreign affairs and the experienced foreign affairs officers who have little knowledge of the technical fields of computers and systems analysis.
>
> The coordination responsibility in policy direction also involves...the pulling together of courses of action and resource allocations for many programs in pursuit of overall objectives.
>
> The State Department should do more and better planning.
>
> Without effective management, the President cannot have the confidence in the Department that is necessary if it is to be utilized effectively.

The effect of the AFSA studies was decidedly positive, generating a wave of interest and desire for reform from within the Department.[37] When the incoming Nixon administration rescinded NSAM-341 and created the strong NSC staff, soon termed the "pocket State Department" by the press, these pressures for reform grew in intensity.[38] Early in

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[36] "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," published as Part Two of the November 1968 Foreign Service Journal.

[37] Harr, op. cit., p. 287-289.

[38] Campbell, op. cit., pp. 267-270.

1970, William B. Macomber, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, initiated a series of studies under the direction of thirteen task forces, each composed of Department personnel and instructed to investigate thoroughly, and make recommendations on, a particular area of management reform within State. The results of these task force reports were compiled in a document over 600 pages long and containing 505 specific recommendations.[39] Several of the recommendations were adopted immediately, and a schedule was developed for further study and implementation of the remainder. As of January 1972, approximately 400 of the task force recommendations either had taken effect or been approved for implementation.[40]

The reports of Task Forces XI, XII, and XIII provided precepts and models for foreign affairs management, including policymaking, resource allocation, implementation and evaluation, and gave birth to the acronym: "PARA," A "Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation" system was to become the Department's answer to the Defense Department's "PPBS" (Planning, Programming, Budgeting System), which was Presidentially prescribed in 1965 for the Executive Branch, but ignored by policy-oriented officers in the Department.[41]

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[39] "Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State," (Washington: USGPO) December, 1970.

[40] Remarks by William B. Macomber, "Change in Foggy Bottom: An Anniversary Report," Department of State Press Release No. 22, dtd. 26 January 1972.

[41] President Johnson announced that PPBS would be installed government-wide on 25 August 1965. This was followed on 12 October by Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 66-3, the basic implementing directive.

II. PARA AND CASP: CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPMENT

A. THE PARA CONCEPT

"Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation" (PARA) first appeared in the Task Force XI report on "Roles and Functions of Diplomatic Missions," where the members felt they could "...devise a methodology to improve and clarify policy formulation and incorporate the whole foreign affairs system into a related resource allocation system."[42] Nine points were outlined as "essential features" of such a system.[43]

> 1. It must be based firmly on an agreed inventory of U.S. interests abroad which at least attempts to be all inclusive....
>
> 2. Guidance on U.S. interests and policy should be Washington initiated, and field response should propose programs and allocations needed to implement policy.
>
> 3. It must include a rigorous analytical process that would be more or less standard....
>
> 4. It should link programs to interests and describe programs in a fashion that permits comparison between countries and regions.
>
> 5. The design must be such that the system can evolve, eventually permitting analysis of the cost/benefit type.
>
> 6. The system must yield program and cost data that are comparable between countries and regions and which can be translated into budget figures readily.
>
> 7. Both the policy analysis information and the program data should be prepared for automated data processing....
>
> 8. The System must function within an institutional structure providing both independent analytical capability located at the proper points in the structure and systematic review procedures at the appropriate levels insuring that important issues are surfaced and decisions respecting them made.

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[42] "Diplomacy for the 70's," p. 453.

[43] Ibid.

9. The system must be flexible enough to take into account changes in the importance of U.S. interests or in conditions in the foreign country.

Three recommendations regarding design and implementation of a PARA system were submitted by Task Force XI. The first two together incorporated the nine points stated above into a proposed "system;" the third recommended using the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs as a laboratory for developing such a system, based on its experience with the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP). This brief introduction to PARA further referenced the Task Force XIII report as a source of amplification of system design, and concluded with a disclaimer designed to allay any fears of "automated decisionmaking," which might have been aroused among elements of the non-technical FSO corps.

> The PARA system...is designed to be helpful. It is not expected to replace human beings in any way. Judgment remains the essential element in determining options. The system is aimed at giving the decisionmaker a broader grasp of the issues and a sense of having considered all relevant factors.[44]

The Task Force XIII report on "Management Tools" did not in fact make any reference to PARA, yet many of the ideas presented by Task Force XI were discussed in a somewhat loose, functional listing of elements that would compose their desired global/regional substantive management system. For example:[45]

> We have isolated four basic functions which together make up the Department's role in the foreign policy process: (1) it makes decisions; (2) it manages its own resources; (3) it exercises leadership in the foreign affairs community; and (4) it communicates with Congress and the public about foreign affairs.

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[44] Ibid., p. 454.

[45] Ibid., pp. 535-537.

> The Department must exercise its leadership role in the foreign affairs community in a number of ways: it must contribute to the interagency formulation of foreign policy; it must provide other agencies involved in foreign affairs with policy guidance; and it should coordinate the implementation of foreign policy decisions.
>
> ...top structure at the Department level and top structure at the bureau level should include: built-in facilities for explicit consideration of alternative course of action...appraisal and review of ongoing policies; interagency coordination and planning; and linking of bureau, departmental, and other agency resources to policy and ultimately to national interests.
>
> Country plans are a starting point; these should be expanded into regional plans, and finally into a global plan. These plans should be used to establish budget guidelines and priorities.

One particularly interesting point found throughout the Task Force XIII report was its explicit recognition of the revised NSC system as a permanent component of any management structure to be devised. This is not to say that the task force totally agreed with the new role of the White House staff. On the contrary, alterations within State of structures, functions and staff relationships were recommended in order to enhance the Department's role within the NSC environment. The task force particularly disagreed with the "unrealistic and potentially disruptive" process by which reports from the IG staffs pass directly to the NSC Senior Review Group without going through the Secretariat for approval, and the fact that the Under Secretaries' Committee has no direct relationship with the IG's. The NSC system was accepted as a permanent element in the Executive Branch, however, and the following assumptions were made explicit:

1. Our basic foreign policy analysis and decisionmaking system will be based on interagency mechanisms serving the President, particularly the NSC system;

2. In the interagency process of formulating foreign policy the Department will play a major role and will exercise leadership on a broad range of policy issues;

3. The Department will have a key role in implementing foreign policy decisions, and will have the primary role in the conduct of diplomacy.[46]

After recognizing the fragmented role played by the "seventh floor"[47] in managing the activities of the Department and the foreign affairs community, Task Force XIII made a number of recommendations concerning the four functions described earlier as the Department's role in the foreign policy process. In order to tie together their recommendations, the group described an "envisioned system," suggesting a management hierarchy that would use the full efforts and resources of the Department to maintain effective control of the foreign policy process. Constructed on three levels of decisionmaking, the model provided for a Strategic Management Center at the Department level, Bureau Management Centers at the regional/functional level, with country/office directors at the lowest level remaining essentially unchanged. The enhanced management capability at the seventh floor was advocated in order to facilitate the installation of a global planning and resource allocation system, such as a PARA. The "envisioned system" perceived the NSC in much more of a watchdog and appellate capacity, with the initiative for planning and operational control relinquished to the Department. Using its initiative, the Department would issue global planning guidance to be passed down through the regional or functional bureaus to the country offices and missions, triggering at that "working level" a well defined methodology that would produce uniform, timely and useable

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[46] Ibid., p. 544.

[47] The seventh floor is the location of the Secretariat and the offices of most senior Department personnel and their staffs, hence a physical position in the hierarchy.

planning documents to pass back up the line and surface key policy issues for decisionmakers to consider, while neatly relating objectives and programs to concomitant resources.

Such was PARA: acronym, analytic methodology, check list of "essential features," and system concept with iterative cycles from strategic planning to implementation and operation of America's official international activities. From experience on the Department's Planning and Coordination Staff and through research into the PARA concepts held by the regional bureaus, this writer feels that little has been achieved to date in developing the conceptual framework of PARA; and what has been done either was unavailable to the bureaus or unsought by them.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization and Management until summer 1971, Thomas Stern, was first directed to coordinate the PARA effort throughout the Department. In an interview with this writer on 20 May 1971, Mr. Stern outlined the three factors governing the current approach toward development of a PARA system.

First, Mr. Stern explained that the Department's experiences with country programming and PPBS had been quite negative, no small part of which was due to the rigidity of the various approaches in their efforts to program foreign affairs. Therefore, the philosophy this time was to grant the regional bureaus a free hand to develop the approach they felt most beneficial to them. Great care must be taken not to stifle creativity or breed instant resistance by forcing conformity to a particular system that might not be most applicable to that bureau's needs.

Secondly, a basic assumption underlying the above approach is the idea that a single system embracing all regional areas cannot be implemented in the near future. Mr. Stern's principal example was the individual country orientation of the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) system used throughout Latin America. He explained that although the individual country papers work well in that regional environment, such would not be the case in Europe. Regional political, military and economic alignments in Europe constrain country policies to a degree not found in Latin America, necessitating more of a regionally oriented approach to PARA.

Finally, Mr. Stern asserted that rigid processes and formal methodologies would inhibit the individual FSO's contribution of insights and values while producing additional bureaucratic layers and delay.

In this writer's opinion, there are sociological and psychological factors existing within the Department that are more germane to Mr. Stern's acceptance of three "governing factors" than the conditions mentioned immediately above. Insight into these conditions may be obtained from: Chris Argyris, "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness within the Department of State;" Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership; and John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat. It suffices to say that under existing conditions, Mr. Stern had few real alternatives.

There is one staff organization within the Department in an ideal position to influence the conceptual framework of the PARA, and that is the Planning and Coordination Staff. From the writer's experience as a member, the planning function on this staff is almost totally usurped in supporting NSC study requirements; it is only fair to say

that individual members had little time, even given the inclination, to carry-out such a project. Several members, notably V. Rodger Digilio and Fisher Howe before him, did contribute some very thoughtful and constructive studies in the attempts to develop a process for making PARA operational, but their papers were not widely circulated outside the staff.

Where this background leads is to the importance of the one document that provided the only operational model available to the Department. That document is the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), written in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs since 1966. The CASP during 1971 underwent a change in methodology to a highly formalized logic structure; and the reader will be introduced to this second generation model, CASP II. A critical look at the CASP II is necessary in order to evaluate the extent to which it fulfills the desired criteria for PARA.

B. THE CASP AS A MODEL

1. What is CASP?

In the fall of 1966 Lincoln Gordon, while Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (ARA), succeeded in converting the remains of a discredited "Comprehensive Country Programming System" (CCPS) into the first CASP for each of the Latin American states. The attempt was the first time a regional bureau sought to establish a planning, programming and budgeting system.[48] The Bureau was unique within the Department, however, because both Lincoln Gordon and Edwin M. Martin before him had experience and interest in management and

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[48] Mosher and Harr, op. cit., p. 189.

economic affairs.[49] They had provided most of the test countries for the earlier CCPS and they were accustomed to the integration of State and AID (Agency for International Development) activities within one Bureau.

The first CASP products were country-originated, country-oriented documents, borrowing the better features of the CCPS and FAPS[50] systems. The first CASPS were not a very uniform product, because the quality depended to a great extent on the interest and enthusiasm of the Ambassador and/or Country Team. The desired document was to be a five-year projection of general and specific U.S. objectives in a country, a related division of programs on an inter-agency basis, and concomitant costs. The analyses done were narrative assessments, which, when approved by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) became a statement of U.S. foreign policy. Each year the CASP process was evaluated and refined until finally, in late 1970, the Assistant Secretary for ARA, Charles A. Meyer, decided to incorporate the major "lessons-learned" into a revised, more formalized structure on an experimental basis.[51] Four countries were selected for the CASP II experiment: Panama, Venezuela, Guatemala and Ecuador. By August 1971, these four pilot products were completed, and the decision was made to implement CASP II throughout Latin America.

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[49] Ibid., pp. 38-40, 188-189.

[50] An excellent description and evaluation of these systems may be found in Mosher and Harr's Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership.

[51] This information was obtained in interviews and discussions with ARA/IG staff members during the writer's internship.

2. The CASP Methodology

With CASP II now standard in ARA, its approach must be evaluated as a model for a global PARA system. One point from which to take a critical look at the CASP is the perspective of those who designed the system.

> The CASP...is a country-oriented planning document for U.S. agencies in Latin America. As such, it examines U.S. interests in Latin American countries and sets objectives the U.S. should achieve to preserve and advance those interests. It serves to identify issues likely to arise in the planning period, to mark out directions for U.S. policy, and to provide gross estimates of future resource requirements which time and experience will serve to refine.
>
> The CASP is not a detailed programming document, nor a comprehensive exercise in personnel planning....Nor is the CASP an exercise in contingency planning. It looks to the future, describes the situation most likely to exist in the planning period and plans for that situation only.[52]

As for the time period, CASP II looks only two years ahead for planning: the "near term" fiscal year (FY1), commencing on 1 July following CASP preparation, and the "far term" fiscal year(FY2) which immediately follows. Planning for the CASP begins with the issuance of guidance approximately 18 months prior to FY 1. It is intended that the document should be completed and approved within 12 months, that is, in time to start the planning for FY 2 as near term.

The greatest revision in the CASP II is the establishment of a rigid system of logic which uses U.S. interests as an input and develops foreign policy goals, objectives and courses of action. The IG staff has initiated this process by publishing a generic listing of U.S.

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[52] "CASP Procedural Guidance," published by the Interdepartmental Group, ARA, no date, p. 1.

Chart 1

CASP II LOGIC FLOW



interests, defined as "...broad areas of national concern toward which the U.S. has over time and in varying contexts, devoted effort and resources."[53] With this listing in hand, the Country Team (CT) is requested to identify those interests that are applicable to the host country for the planning period, create related interest statements for that country, and further partition these into specific areas of concern within that interest. Detailed step-by-step instructions, along with a programmed series of forms to complete, are published in ARA's "CASP Procedural Guidance."

Once U.S. interests are explicitly stated, the CT is supposed to examine the host country environment and assess how it might affect each interest. This is carried-out in two steps: first, relevent environmental indicators are selected; and secondly, the futurity of each of these conditions is projected to the end of the planning period, and anticipated consequences assessed.

> Indicators are information categories....They elicit information about those factors in the environment which bear on U.S. interests--either affecting their well-being or serving as an accurate barometer of their condition.[54]

An example of an indicator, constructed for the hypothetical U.S. interest that a host country not make alliances hostile to the U.S., might be: the level of foreign communist government and/or military presence in the host country. The current condition of the indicator would be a specific statement of the levels of presence, in numbers if they are known.

The next step is to identify any challenges to, or opportunities for U.S. interests. A Challenge might be a direct threat to one or more

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[53] Ibid., p. 3.

[54] Ibid., p. 4.

interests. The output of this exercise is the assignment of a "degree of concern" for the specific interest, which may be assigned as "high, medium, low, or none." For interests assigned a "low" or "none," the analysis stops there. For "high" and "medium," the analysis moves on to "issue identification."

> "An issue is stated in terms of how the U.S. should plan to meet one or more anticipated challenges to an interest or how to take advantage of one or more forecasted opportunities to preserve or advance an interest."[55]

Usually three or four of these issues will be designated as major, warranting Washington review. For these major issues, the Country Team is required to write an explicit issue analysis and resolution paper; for lesser issues, the inquiry proceeds without resort to a special paper.

The final step in the new CASP process is the identification of goals, objectives and courses of action.

> ...goals are conditions believed to be achievable in a time frame extending beyond FY 2.
>
> Objectives are conditions which are likely to be achieved in a fiscal year, through the conduct of one or more U.S. courses of action.
>
> ...courses of action--broad initiatives or steps conducted by the U.S. so as to arrive at a desired condition within a fiscal year.[56]

Goals are stated for each issue that is identified. Specific objectives are selected for each goal and scheduled for achievement within the time-frame of the planning period; explicit courses of action are

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[55] Ibid., p. 10.

[56] Ibid., p. 13.

to achieve each objective, thereby completing the policy analysis portion of the CASP II.

Remaining is what this writer considers to be the weakest portion of the CASP--the linkage of the policy analysis flow to the resources necessary for policy implementation. The cursory system used in the CASP has three simple parts: first, estimate resource requirements for each course of action; second, identify already approved programs in support of this course of action; and third, identify the new resource requirements. These statements of resource requirements are then incorporated into a set of summary documents, and the section on resources, for purposes of the CASP, is completed.

In brief, the new CASP process invokes formalized logical reasoning to select foreign policy objectives and courses of action. Its logic is based conceptually on the assumptions that certain categories of long-term U.S. interests in foreign countries do exist and the U.S. has a desire to further these interests through positive action programs.

It is the opinion of this writer that the aspect of resource allocation with the CASP has the appearance of an incidental appendage and is not really a critical part of the analysis. It is evident from reading the "CASP Procedural Guidance" that neither the scarcity of resources nor the need for choice among alternatives for the optimal allocation of resources is explicitly considered critical to the decisionmaking process. It is evident moreover that no mechanism relates courses of action to <u>available</u> resources, in order to determine the <u>feasibility</u> and suggest the preferability of various objectives or courses of action.

Next to be considered is how the CASP II might relate to the proposed PARA concept. Less obvious strengths and weaknesses of the CASP will be appraised, along with a closer look at some elements of PARA.

3. CASP and the PARA Concept

For a number of practical reasons, CASP II and the proposed PARA system are quite similar. It was this writer's experience in researching PARA at State that the individuals primarily responsible for development of the CASP also were instrumental for promoting the PARA concept. Moreover, the CASP was a four-year-old, functioning system in ARA when the Macomber forces were working hard to develop a Department-wide concept. If the reader were to refer back to the nine "essential features" of a PARA system, stated in the first pages of this chapter, he would note the first four were extracted from "CASP Guidance," or vice versa. This origin raises two questions about PARA: is the PARA little more than a super-CASP; and if so, can it best do the desired job of facilitating strategic planning and decisionmaking in a global context? A closer look at the CASP is necessary to answer these questions.

The strengths of the CASP system are impressive when compared to the void in systematic policy analysis that existed before the system was instituted. The CASP is now an established and accepted process, carried-out on an annual cycle. It draws together into an integrated effort the executive agencies involved in the conduct of America's foreign affairs in a given country, particularly those elements within the Country Team. It requires preparation of a single document which crosses if not transcends, agency bounds in considering

U.S. Foreign policy objectives and courses of action. This process is usually one of conflict and consensus-building among members of the Country Team, with major remaining disagreements forwarded for resolution to a Washington interagency organ, the NSC's [regional] Interdepartment Group (IG) for American Republic Affairs. It is this writer's opinion that such coordination of executive agency efforts should be a major goal of any policy management system, and represents an important breakthrough for the foreign affairs community.

The CASP methodology is well-defined and is uniformly used throughout the geographic region. It offers opportunities for cross-country comparisons and makes possible the development of a coherant regional plan. Additionally, the process facilitates the early identification of critical policy issues, a task necessary to the goal of supplanting crisis-management with long-range planning and regional choices among alternatives.

The greatest strength of the CASP, however, is in concept rather than in the execution. Two of its major shortcomings, viewed in terms of the needs of a global PARA, are timing and inflexibility.[57] The CASP process begins 18 months before the start of the execution period, and the document is in final form at least six months before it takes effect. The consensus required for successful passage through drafting and reviewing demands much time and energy, and no up-dating processes are integrated into the system. Consequently, a potential user is given a plan that is at best six months out-of-date when it

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[57] These two elements were cited frequently in interagency interviews conducted by Bendix Aerospace Systems Division analysts who were working under a contract to evaluate the CASP. Excerpts from these interviews were published in a draft working paper, not for quotation.

first comes into effect. It may contain assumptions about a situation that may be more than a year old. Today's world political situation is too dynamic for a planning system unable to accomodate rapid changes in assumptions, objectives and courses of action, if not in ultimate goals. A government can be deposed and replaced in hours; broad changes may be effected rapidly in a country's environment, which would necessitate major revisions in objectives, programs and resource allocations. Any cyclical planning system that does not incorporate a means for rapid review and update risks obsolescence for its planning.

A flexible review and update capability for country and regional planning would, in this writer's opinion, solve a major manpower problem posed by the CASP. The annual writing of lengthy and complex country plans is time-consuming for those involved, and the burden imposed by such a major annual undertaking is the principal reason for the inflexibility of the process and inviolability of the documents once they are drafted. A more practical approach would be to make frequent reviews of the plan's content, in the light of fluctuations in a host country's environment and U.S. interests, performance under selected courses of action, and developments that may become critical challenges or opportunities. Reviews and revisions should be handled either routinely or given whatever priority the Country Team believes warranted by the urgency of the situation. The IG would be called to assess and approve amendments, subject to a system of priorities. Changes would be entered into the planning document upon approval while unaffected portions of the basic document would be left unchanged. The CASP would remain current and useable, yet the work load on both Embassy and IG staffs could be reduced and stabilized once the system is established.

Weaknesses in the CASP mentioned above are due to failings in the conduct of the system design; other weaknesses arise from the system's limited scope, which does not encompass all the many facets of the PARA proposal. The discrepencies between the present CASP and the proposed PARA must be examined.

First, the CASP procedural Guidance states quite clearly that the CASP is not "...an exercise in contingency planning," designed to meet change or circumstances. Neither does the CASP offer alternative courses of action designed to achieve approximately the same objective within a similar environment. Both contingencies for probable environmental change and alternatives within a fixed environment are necessary to provide flexibility and choice within a comprehensive management system. To assume the environment will remain fixed throughout a lengthy course of action developed to achieve a given objective can only be fallacious reasoning in a dynamic world environment.

Secondly, planning presupposes that some method exists to weigh the effectiveness of alternative courses of action. In the CASP, no such method exists. This writer believes that in a comprehensive policy analysis system operating under conditions of limited resources, such effectiveness measures are a necessity. The series of reviews mentioned earlier should be used to spot-check the effectiveness or cost of policies, programs or operations, and provide the impetus for new decisions when warranted. Establishment of measures of effectiveness is dealt with at length in chapters three and four.

The last deficiency to be discussed is not with the CASP, as such, but a shortcoming of the wider Departmental system in which CASP operates. It is not the practice of the Secretary or the seventh floor to suggest preliminary strategic and fiscal guidance for planning

purposes, followed after a reasonable period by definitive strategic and fiscal policy, both common procedures in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The resultant lack of guidance on the likely availability of resources hampers effective use of cost/benefit analysis as an aid to choosing among alternative programs. Although a number of objectives in foreign affairs might be achieved at very little cost in resources by using diplomatic presence and able negotiation, in the writer's opinion, this possibility constitutes inadequate justification for failing to measure and compare those costs that <u>are</u> substantial. Department planners and decisionmakers must consider the whole of America's foreign affairs objectives, programs and costs and not sub-optimize at the level of Department of State objectives, programs and resources. This assumption requires that the Secretary of State be exceptionally aggressive in the coordination of interagency efforts in foreign affairs, fulfilling the precepts of both President Johnson's NSAM-341 and President Nixon's message of 7 February 1969. But, as Professor Schelling has said:

> ...to put this responsibility on the Secretary of State is to give him both a means and an obligation to assume the kind of executive authority that has never, in spite of executive orders and the logic of ideal government, either been wholly acceptable to the Department of State or freely offered to it. This is to put the purse strings directly into the hands of the Secretary of State with encouragement to use them in the executive management of foreign policy.[58]

C. THE ROAD AHEAD

1. Implementing PARA: The First Attempt

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[58] Thomas C. Schelling, "PPBS And Foreign Affairs," <u>Planning Programming Budgeting</u> Inquiry of Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (Washington: USGPO), 1970, p. 119.

One year after the publication of "Diplomacy for the 70's" and its call for a PARA system, four regional bureaus were implementing policy analysis systems. ARA undertook CASP II. The Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) produced EUROPARA. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF) came up with "Country Policy Papers." The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EA) inaugerated a country PARA system. Credit must be given to these bureaus for effort they have begun. Unfortunately, there is not enough information available at this time to conduct a comprehensive and fair analysis of the several systems.

A few general comments about the three newer systems of EUR, AF and EA are all the writer feels justified to make on the basis of his brief experience in the Department during 1971. First, no inter-bureau standardized methodology was established. Consequently, each bureau developed a more or less unique process. Although each bureau used U.S. interests as the point of departure, each developed a separate inventory of interests which differed with the listing used by ARA. Most of the preparation of each of these PARA documents was carried-out within the bureaus in Washington, not by the Country Team as the CASP is prepared. A rigid methodology conducive to analysis was not emphasized, allowing bureaus to fall back on narrative discussions of interests and objectives. Finally, in this writer's opinion, none of the new PARA approaches offered a resource summary any more comprehensive or useful than that used in the CASP.

To conclude, each of the new regional PARA systems is in an early stage of evolution, and none shows any advantages over CASP II. There are wide variations in levels of sophistication among all four approaches, justifying concern that less-than-desirable regional

systems will become institutionalized and resistant to further innovation. The writer believes that a degree of standardization is necessary for global PARA to operate effectively. A key problem that must be faced soon is finding a way to draw all approaches together into a unified PARA system.

2. Institutional Resistance and Technical Problems

Based on numerous interviews with Department officials, exposure to the decisionmaking system and research into recent programming efforts at State, it is the opinion of this writer that progress toward a comprehensive PARA system for the Department will meet resistance primarily from two courses. First, bureaucratic inertia and lip-service will continue to cause major delays, if not more serious difficulties, unless either the Secretary himself or the Under Secretary takes an active interest and pushes reform. Secondly, the technical problems such as methodology, measurement, quantification and process must be resolved early through the Secretary's sponsorship of advanced systems development and concomitant training in modern management and analytical techniques for FSO's.

In a memorandum he prepared for the Jackson Subcommittee hearings on PPBS, Thomas Schelling made this incisive statement: "PPBS can be a splendid tool to help top management make decisions; but there has to be a top management that wants to make decisions."[59] Schelling witnessed this problem first-hand in the State Department during a period in the spring of 1967, when first he accepted and later refused a post as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Through extensive

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[59] Ibid., p. 111.

conversations with senior Department officials, Schelling began to realize that the strong top-level executive support necessary to implement a major philosophical reorientation toward new management theories and tools, would not be forthcoming from the Department hierarchy. This realization was enough to dissuade a Schelling, as it has many other men over the past decade. It is the writer's opinion that only a very senior executive, who is willing to take a highly active personal role as an innovator and can use and support an able staff, can break through the organizational inertia and "negotiated settlement" syndrome to make effective modifications in the system. The fact that the Department of State, alone among all agencies of the Federal Government, has separated management and administrative functions from substantive (policy) matters at the highest levels has limited the availability of command billets to two: the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

The writer feels that if the problem of executive support were solved, the time necessary to overcome technical problems could be reduced by no less than a factor of five. Tools that could relieve most of the management information difficulties in the Department already exist, and could be employed in six months if acquiring and using them were given high priority by the Secretary. Country programming methodology does not benefit from continued tolerance of five divergent regional efforts. Enough foundation has been laid to support development of a comprehensive system applicable to all regions, given strong executive support for the task and creation of a seventh floor team with programming and analytical know-how. Based on a personal investigation of the Department's message center, computer facility and related information-handling systems in January 1972, this writer believes that the ancillary

capability to automate the storage, retrieval and manipulation of substantive information and country programming data exists within the Department now, and needs only a firm hand and a new set of priorities to activate it.

It is the writer's opinion that all functions described above could be operational within a year if supported by that one essential input--strong executive action. If this element is missing, one can only hope that a small resolute nucleus, committed to the betterment of the system, will continue its efforts. Under such conditions they would be required to develop, market and install each innovative effort through a lengthy and sometimes disillusioning process. Such is the situation today with the Methods and Systems Staff. It was created as a result of the Macomber Task Force recommendation that some group should seek out and introduce new managerial and analytical techniques into the Department. Though laudable in concept, this effort originates from the management (administrative) side of the house, not the substantive or policy side. Therefore, it has neither strong executive support, funds for research or training, nor top level technical expertise. Though staff members are enthusiastic, they are forced to compromise and dilute their advice in order to achieve a modicum of success. If the Secretary's or Under Secretary's priorities remain unchanged, the Methods and Systems Staff has a long road ahead.

3. Shortcomings in the PARA Concept

Before proceeding with the development of a foreign affairs policymaking model, one final question should be answered. What if the PARA/CASP system were to take effect the way its designers envisioned it? Would it meet the needs of the Department?

Throughout the discussion of PARA and the explanation of CASP in this chapter, strong and weak points of the concepts have been presented. The author's answer to the above question is no; the envisioned PARA will not meet the needs of the Department, and the CASP does not meet the present requirements for a PARA. A review of the proposed system's conceptual shortcomings should bear out this contention.

First and foremost, the PARA system is not designed for the total foreign affairs community. It limits itself to the Department of State, and further subordinates its policymaking processes to the current NSC system. Secondly, the PARA system follows the CASP approach to resource allocation, rendering either invalid or inconsequent the policy analysis which is produced, because it fails to take adequate account of the "opportunity cost"[60] of scarce resources. Policies, programs and alternatives are developed without regard to their feasibility and preferability, while choices among alternatives are made without explicit consideration of cost. No less a weakness to the policy analysis and choice processes is the lack of measures of effectiveness applicable to the strategic planning, program or operational perspectives. There is no explicit methodology in the PARA system for evaluation of the effectiveness of alternatives at any phase of the policymaking process.

The previous look at CASP processes revealed significant deficiencies in the annual cycle, since a major effort is expended each year in totally redoing the CASP's throughout ARA. The environment

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60 Opportunity cost is the real cost or sacrifice, in terms of other opportunities foregone, of producing an additional unit of a particular commodity.

is fixed eighteen months before the planning period begins, and a large amount of work is done to arrive at many of the previous year's conclusions. Once the cycle is complete, the same effort begins again on FY 2, still six months before the CASP for FY 1 takes effect. Consequently, the resultant action document is dated, but no attempt is made to review and update it because of the massive effort already expended and current demand for a subsequent CASP. The result is a product that is produced at great expense in manpower, but seldom consulted and even less frequently considered binding.

A final weakness of the PARA system is its lack of a global unified and central concept. There is no universal PARA idée fixe. Four regional bureaus have developed their own ideas and methodologies with broad variance in levels of sophistication. No Departmental entity has been charged with devising a global theory or structure for policymaking. No effort has been expended to create even a loose union among the four systems now in existence. Without a central unifying force and the development of a universally applicable body of theory, the present regional concepts can do little but grow more divergent. The longer this situation continues to exist, the more institutionalized and resistant to change these independent efforts will become.

In the following chapters, the author has designed a foreign affairs policymaking system which should overcome most, if not all, of the deficiencies noted above. The next chapter commences with a positive view of what the system should be.

III. POLICYMAKING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL

The presentation of the policymaking model will be in two parts. This chapter gives a description and discussion of the major characteristics this writer believes requisite in foreign affairs policymaking. In Chapter IV a detailed analysis is made of the model's four principal phases of policymaking and their component sub-processes.

The major characteristics of the proposed policymaking system are: 1) the system must be qualitative in character; 2) it must enhance both objective and intuitive decisionmaking; 3) it must have policy evaluation capabilities; 4) it must incorporate allocation of scarce resources; 5) it is designed for a unified foreign affairs community; 6) it stresses an effective communications network and built-in information feedback system; and 7) the system must be flexible, in its capability to make immediate adjustments to changing policy environments and in the long-range growth and development of the policymaking system.

A. THE SYSTEM MUST BE QUALITATIVE IN CHARACTER

Two overriding problems have plagued analysts in their efforts over the past decade to program foreign affairs: conceptual difficulties in quantification of variables and measurement criteria, and the complexities of establishing the linkage between inputs and outputs in setting foreign policy. In the writer's opinion it was the combination of quantification and linkage problems that led to the almost total input orientation of the early programming efforts in foreign affairs.[61] The Comprehensive

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[61] A detailed description of the two systems in this category, CCPS and FAPS, is given in Mosher and Harr, op. cit., Ch. I and III.

Country Programming System (CCPS) rigidly required that all inputs at the country level be expressed in either dollars or man-hours. The subsequent Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS) dropped the man-hour dimension but continued to require monetary measures of input costs. Then unable to establish linkages between their dollar and man-hour inputs and the foreign policy and program outputs, proponents of programming continued to aggregate salaries of diplomats, administrators and clerks, together with foreign aid appropriations, loans and grants. They argued that the more data they could accumulate and analyze, the better would be the resulting decisions. This writer agrees with Frederick Mosher that little appreciation was shown for "...the fact that many decisions in the foreign affairs arena, probably the most important ones, are not budgetary.... The principal determinants of such decisions are qualitative, not reducible to dollars or other countable units."[62]

The above discussion should not be construed by the reader as condemnation of quantitative analysis in the planning and implementation of foreign policy decisions. In those limited areas where goals and objectives can be made operational and explicit, inputs are quantifiable, and measurement criteria exist, quantitative analysis offers positive advantages to the decisionmaker.

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[62] Frederick C. Mosher, "Program Budgeting in Foreign Affairs: Some Reflections," Planning Programming Budgeting, op. cit., p. 153.

Yet even in the areas where quantitative analysis is most applicable, the decisionmaker will have a range of qualitative inputs that measurably affect his judgment. Quade clearly points-out that the higher the level of decision, the more intuitive and subjective the decision process becomes.

> The point is that every quantitative analysis, no matter how innocuous it appears, eventually passes into an area where pure analysis fails, and subjective judgment enters. This is important; in making these choices the real decisions may be being made. In other words, judgment and intuition permeate every aspect of analysis: in limiting its extent; in deciding what hypotheses and approaches are likely to be more fruitful; in determining what the "facts" are and what numerical values to use, and in finding the logical sequence of steps from assumption to conclusion. [63]

It is mandatory, then, to design a system which enhances qualitative analysis techniques in policymaking. Such a system should take advantage of quantitative inputs, when available, but cannot rely on quantification. Analysis is of no lower order simply because it is not expressed in symbols; this writer believes that the reverse may be true. The judgmental abilities of an effective high-level decisionmaker are continuously in scarce supply, as they can be developed only through a lengthy process of education, training and experience in an increasingly complex environment. To attempt to bypass or supplant these abilities would be to ignore the most valuable and productive of resources. The level of technology necessary to reproduce or even simulate such complex judgmental processes does not exist now, nor is it likely to exist in the forseeable future. The solution must be to recognize these subjective aspects of policymaking and incorporate them into the system in a manner designed to take fullest advantage of their strengths.

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[64] E. S. Quade, "On the Limitations of Quantitative Analysis," RAND Paper P-4530, December 1970, p. 10.

As Quade has noted, subjective elements already are implicit in the decisionmaking process. The author believes that a decisionmaker can recognize and list many of the elements of intuition and subjective judgment he will use to evaluate a particular situation. Then he can array the quantifiable elements together with them and obtain a more complete look at the inputs to his own decision process.

Once a decisionmaker can view all these elements together, his understanding of the problem should be increased. He should be able to better recognize and assess alternative courses of action and perhaps even assign values or weightings to the qualitative elements.

What are these qualitative aspects of decisionmaking? Once they are arrayed, how analytic can the decisionmaker be? These questions lead to the next requirement of our policymaking system.

B. BOTH OBJECTIVE AND INTUITIVE DECISIONMAKING

> ...it is no longer enough merely to state the existence of nonrational factors; policy scientists must find a way of taking account of their presence in the decision process so that their distorting effects can be reduced. Just as we have developed neat analytical models to describe problems, identify alternatives, and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each choice, so must we begin to explicate nonrational factors in the policy process and to design models useful to policy formulators in assessing elements of nonrationality in their decisions.[65]

The above comment by Dr. Timothy W. Costello is apt; the intuitive or "non-rational" factors must be taken explicitly into account when examining or designing policymaking processes. Yet this writer takes issue with Dr. Costello's implication that these factors are a negative,

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[65] Timothy W. Costello, "Psychological Aspects: The Soft Side of Policy Formation," Policy Sciences, vol. 1, no. 2, 1970, pp. 161-162.

"distorting" influence in the decisionmaking process. As already noted, the inductive reasoning capabilities of effective high-level decision-makers are scarce and valuable resources which should be exploited rather than avoided. Efforts should be taken to develop and make explicit the inductive capacity, intuition and insight of human beings, understanding that these processes are essential in those many areas where analytical tools and techniques have not been developed or perfected. This author prefers Yehezkel Dror's interpretation of extrarational [nonrational] factors in policymaking.

> First, limited resources, uncertain conditions and lack of knowledge place strict limits on the degree to which policy-making can feasibly be rational, so that policymakers much necessarily rely a great deal on extrarational processes. Second, only extrarational processes will work in some phases of policymaking; for example, policymakers need "creativity" to invent new alternatives. Third...extra-rational processes may solve some problems in some phases better than rational processes could, even though the latter by themselves could also solve the problems.[66]

In the third case Dror is hypothesizing a situation where the rational process is fully developed, but the well-developed "extrarational" process is more efficient and more effective. To illustrate: an experienced diplomat may be more accurate, as well as much quicker, in his assessment of a country's predicted reaction to a given situation than could be ascertained through a detailed historical analysis of that country's reaction patterns in similar circumstances. His informed intuition may recognize subtle changes in attitudes that would not be apparent in the aggregated data.

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[66] Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

Although the discussion in this section centers around the inductive and intuitive aspects of decisionmaking, it is implicit that the pure-rationality[67] process would be used in those areas where the information is available and the operations of securing and processing it are cost-effective. The concept here is that there will be few, if any, "pure" cases of either strategy for decisionmaking. Optimal policymaking will be a mix of rationality and informed intuition, with the weighting of each component dependent on a number of variables, such as availability of resources, perspective, amount of information at hand and degree of inductive capacity.

Finally, Marshall Wiley presents the view of the FSO and the principal officials of the Department of State, that "...informed and experienced judgment remains the central requirement for foreign affairs personnel...."[68] When faced with such an institutional philosophy, this writer believes it is critical that the policymaking system takes full advantage of the type of judgmental talents developed within the Foreign Service, and incorporates a mixture of rational and inductive/intuitive processes in order to achieve this.

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[67] "Pure rationality", as used here, implies total adherence to the "rational" principles of taking into account every aspect of the problem, inventorying and weighting every factor that will bear on the decision, being completely accurate in predicted outcomes for alternatives, and making decisions by calculating expected values and choosing the best. See Dror, ibid., pp. 132-133.

[68] Marshall W. Wiley, "Developing a Strategy of Organizational Change for the Department of State," RAND Paper P-4097, November, 1969, p. 3.

C. EVALUATION OF POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

It is the writer's opinion that to design a system which is qualitative in character and enhances the application of "informed intuition" to decisionmaking corresponds to recognition of the realities in the foreign affairs policymaking environment. Incorporation of these facets into the system is no indication that its processes should be any less rigorously analytic or any less quantitative when quantification is possible. A dynamic, interactive policymaking system must be able to make accurate assessments of the effectiveness of policy decisions, from the highest conceptual level to the most particular operational activity.

The idea of applying measures of effectiveness to policy decisions has a great deal of intuitive appeal, but the problem of developing valid measures in useable form is one of the most complex areas of policy analysis.

> ...consider policymaking on foreign relations. Suboptimization requires that foreign policy issues be allocated to territorial and functional subdivisions of the Department of State and of other departments and agencies....All these bodies, working separately, must inevitably make many contradictory subpolicies. The policymaking system must be constantly evaluated and, when necessary, redesigned so as to minimize these negative consequences of suboptimization, to establish and strengthen needed integrating mechanisms, and to allow for the constant changes in the problems, values, and resources fed into the system from its environment.[69]

The concept of effectiveness measurement came into being when systems analysis swept through the Department of Defense. Due to the nature of the tasks at DOD, most of the effort was applied in the area of hardware procurment, where specific pieces of military equipment were designed to perform fixed tasks at prescribed levels. The measures

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[69] Dror, op. cit., p. 172.

then became the relative abilities of the equipment to perform as prescribed; and most of these measures were of easily quantifiable outputs, such as velocity, accuracy, capacity, and so on. Even the most ambitious attempts did not stray beyond the aggregation of various mixes of individual effectiveness measures, in an effort to evaluate unit or group performance. It is not difficult to understand why initial efforts to transfer almost purely quantitative reasoning to the qualitative problems of foreign affairs were doomed to early failure, yet the necessity for policy evaluation methods has become increasingly critical. As John Franklin Campbell observed:

> If no more convincing rationale for foreign aid can be found than the old anti-communist "national security" argument coupled with generalized American "responsibility" to raise the living standards of poorer states, then AID appropriations will continue to go down. These arguments offer no guide lines for the apportionment of limited U.S. resources, and no yardsticks of accomplishment. They are essentially ideological arguments, and they have been used not only for economic aid, but also to justify U.S. military, intelligence and propaganda programs.70

The past shortcomings of quantitative approaches to evaluation of foreign policy decisions are not, however, indicative of the present state-of-the-art. It is the author's contention that even in the least quantifiable problem areas, the decisionmaker would find it advantageous to make explicit and array all the subjective inputs he can recognize as having a bearing on his decision. Once this information is before him, he can group, weight and evaluate these variables with less liklihood of one item assuming a disproportionate degree of influence on the outcome. The topics of measurement criteria and standards will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

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70 John Franklin Campbell, "What Is To Be Done?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 49, no. 1, October 1970, p. 85.

D. ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES

To be valid, any analysis of policy options must subsume scarcity of resources from the outset; otherwise, policy actions which are infeasible due to insufficient resources would not be identified, and the alternative which offers greatest effectiveness might not surface.[71] As Hitch and McKean recognized, it is axiomatic that:

> ...in all problems of choice we strive to get the most out of what we have. To put it another way, we try to use the resources that are available to us so as to maximize what economists call "utility." Resources are always limited in comparison with our action. (If they did not, we could do everything, and there would be no problem of choosing preferred courses of action.)[72]

The necessary relationship, then, is the linkage of resources to policy actions, where alternatives are weighed and decisions made on the basis of the greatest benefit achievable from the level of resources available. This type of

> ...analysis has great value in turning debates over resource allocation toward the realities and away from simple statements of noble purpose....
>
> Second and closely related, analysis is oriented toward outputs rather than toward inputs. In this way expenditures can be tied to specific goals, and those expenditures which satisfy primarily the traditions or well-being of individual agencies are brought into question.[73]

The above points concerning measures of policy effectiveness and allocation of resources relate to the entire foreign affairs community; yet as Dror pointed out, the many agencies in the field of foreign affairs do not function as a cohesive body. Each is for the

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[71] For a discussion of maximizing effectiveness in the economic context, see Gene H. Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis, (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co.) 1971, pp. 38-40.

[72] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1961, pg. 23.

[73] James R. Schlesinger, "USes and Abuses of Analysis," Planning Programming Budgeting, op. cit., p. 130.

most part independent, budgeted separately by the Congress, and inclined to optimize within its own purview. Campbell phrases the issue quite succinctly:

> The most important administrative task of all is currently not performed by anyone in Washington. The government has no unified foreign affairs budget. Like the three armed services in the 1950's, each agency negotiates separately with the Budget Bureau and then with Congress. This reinforces the impression that we have not one, but many conflicting foreign policies.[74]

Thomas Schelling extends the same idea as an explanation of the primary reason why earlier program budgeting efforts fail at State.

> ...the budget does not yet exist to which PPBS might be applied in the field of foreign affairs. When Secretary McNamara assumed office, he was at least fifteen years ahead of where the Secretary of State is now in having a recognized budget....
>
> Not so the Secretary of State, whose own budget of about a third of a billion dollars a year corresponds, to take a very crude analogy, to the budget that the Secretary of Defense might present for the operation of the Pentagon building and the people who work in it.[75]

It was not the purpose of this paper to seek-out, much less recommend major statutory alterations in existing foreign affairs bureaucracies. The writer recognized at the outset that such an approach could have the undesirable effect of causing the rest of the thesis to be discounted by some of those for whom it is written. Yet all this writer's investigations point to the necessity for moving from budgetary separatism in foreign affairs to consolidation.

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[74] Campbell, op. cit.

[75] Schelling, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

Obviously budgetary discretion and control is a source of influence and power. Many experts have recognized budgetary separatism in the foreign affairs community as an impediment to a unified foreign policy,[76] but few have offered any specific proposals for remedying the situation. In the writer's opinion, John Campbell has developed the most workable solution of any to be found in the literature. Since coercive control over a unified foreign affairs budget is of principal import to the policymaking model presented here, Campbell's recommendations bear consideration. In his most recent work Campbell proposed:

> State's present number-five official, the Deputy Under Secretary for administration, [now "management"] could be redesignated Deputy Under Secretary for the budget, responsible to the Secretary, with other agency agreement, to prepare an integrated foreign affairs budget for the executive branch. The international division of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), comprised of about fifty personnel in all, should be transferred to the new State budget office. Ultimately, American ambassadors in the field should be called on to justify and control all annual government expenditures in their countries, and the five regional assistant secretaries of state should also review these expenditure plans. The Secretary of State should be directly accountable to the President for control over the entire spectrum of moneys and staffs employed abroad, with the exception of military troop costs.[77]

The policy evaluation and resource allocation functions can only be executed properly when substantive and resource management are vested in the same entity, in this case the Secretary of State. An integrated foreign affairs budget is only an element of a much broader concept essential to the proposed model for a policymaking system, namely the notion of a unified foreign policy mechanism.

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[76] For discussion of budgetary separatism in foreign affairs, see John F. Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory; Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership; Thomas Schelling, "PPBS And Foreign Affairs" (detailed cites in bibliography).

[77] John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers) 1971, p. 235.

E. UNIFIED FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICYMAKING SYSTEM

In theory, the State Department has hegemony over all agencies involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. The realities simply do not support this, as has already been noted with regard to the budget.

> Each [agency] has its own powers and responsibilities, whether authorized by statute or executive order or delegation. Each has its own budget and the accountability for its use, and its own set of subcommittees to deal with in Congress. Each hires its own personnel, controls their assignments and commands their loyalties.
>
> Obviously, a system of programming and budgeting which included the activities of all agencies in individual countries and whose primary channel was from Ambassador to Regional Assistant Secretary to Under Secretary and Secretary of State could be threatening to the autonomy of individual agencies.[78]

Yet hegemony by one executive agency is essential to the development of a"single" foreign policy. What is needed is more than Departmental attempts at lateral coordination. In this writer's opinion, extreme requirements for lateral coordination exist as the standard at State today, producing a stereotype of what von Mises calls the "opprobrious connotation of the term bureaucracy."[79] Richard Holbrooke cites perhaps a classic example of such "opprobrium."

> A desk officer in State has recently calculated that while in theory he is the focal point of all Washington efforts concerning "his" country, in fact there are 16 people working on the country in Washington, in different chains of command. They are receiving information directly from the Americans in the country through up to nine different channels. No one sees all the communications in every channel. Through great effort the desk officer has come to know all the other officers, but, he points out, they change regularly (himself included); someone is always out of town or sick; and most importantly, each one has his own boss, who can determine his future career; each one has his own set of priority projects and problems. "All I can do is stay on top of the really important problems," he says.[80]

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[78] Mosher, op. cit., p. 149.

[79] Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1944.

[80] Kissinger, op. cit., p. 159.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for such a mechanism to be responsive to the President, much less one of his principal agents. Only through personal monitoring and intervention can the President now insure that his concept is that carried out, for implementation is frequently spread throughout numerous functional and regional bureaus of agencies over which the Secretary of State and his assistants have no control. In Henry Kissinger's viewpoint, "The impact on national policy is pernicious. Even our highest policy bodies...are less concerned with developing measures in terms of a well-understood national purpose than with adjusting the varying approaches of semi-autonomous departments."[81]

In the writer's opinion, the choices for a foreign affairs policymaking system are clear. The incorporation of less than both formulation and implementation phases into the same policymaking structure might not yield appreciable results. Implicit to the fusion of these phases is centralized budgetary power. Independently funded agencies cannot, or will not, subordinate all policymaking or implementing activities to the will of one coordinating authority, that is, State, while being expected to justify the funding of those policies or implementing programs to the Congress.

There are obvious disadvantages to this centralization of policymaking and budgetary powers, particularly when the agencies which have been incorporated into a unified system have clearly defined tasks to

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[81] Kissinger, op. cit., p. 159.

perform and have developed a high level of expertise in their fields. A useful analogy may be found in the relationships among the Secretary of Defense and the three armed services. The period when Robert Mc Namara was secretary was one of great centralization in the operation of the Department of Defense, and some of the negative aspects of this structure are only now being recognized.[82] If too high a degree of centralization is allowed, a whole new spectrum of difficulties can arise. These problems of over-centralization may equal in severity the problems of over-decentralization. Herbert Simon states the case quite well:

> We may conclude, then, that some measure of centralization is indespensable to secure the advantages of organization: coordination, expertise, and responsibility. On the other hand, the costs of centralization must not be forgotten. It may place in the hands of highly paid personnel decisions which do not deserve their attention. It may lead to a duplication of function which makes the subordinate superfluous. Facilities for communication must be available, sometimes at considerable cost. The information needed for a correct decision may be available only to the subordinate. Finally, centralization leaves idle and unused the powerful coordinative capacity of the human nervous system, and substitutes for it an interpersonal coordinative mechanism.[83]

With the above discussion well in mind, the writer remains convinced that an effective policymaking system for the foreign affairs community must, at the outset, employ a strict hegemonic relationship between the central coordinating authority, the Department of State, and the semi-autonomous agencies. In order to maintain coherent foreign policy from inception through implementation, decision levels must be clearly

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[82] A well-researched, if slanted, discussion of the centralized Defense Department structure under McNamara may be found in Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers) 1970, Ch. 3.

[83] Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: The Free Press) 1957, pp. 239-240.

defined and laterally centralized to insure effective interagency coordination and control. Vertically, the foreign affairs management hierarchy should be a decentralized organization, requiring most implementation decisions to be made by the Chief-of-Mission and his staff at the country level. The Chief-of-Mission, an Ambassador or a Minister, is surely capable of supervising program implementation and operational decisionmaking; the last three Chief Executives have explicitly expressed this point-of-view.[84]

Structuring the foreign affairs policymaking system in this manner should yield two principal benefits. First, it should stimulate the inter-agency cohesiveness necessary to the conduct of a coherent policy, and constitute an enormous stride toward unification of the foreign affairs community. Secondly, such a structure should place decision-making authority at the appropriate levels, relieving Department principals of much routine work that could be handled better by the Country Team.

Finally, the author is not alone in his assessment that time is not on the side of the bureaucracies. The machinery is growing continually more ponderous and cumbersome while the demands placed on it are escalating at a phenomenal rate.

> The person who has the most to gain from a massive reform of the foreign affairs machine--besides the American taxpayer--is the President himself. If a manageable and responsive apparatus is a true Presidential priority, then he personally must order major changes. Each President must decide whether or not he will attempt major changes, or instead choose to

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[84] President Kennedy's letter to the ambassadors, 29 May 1961; Message of the Secretary of State "To My Colleagues in the Department of State and Abroad" on the Occasion of NSAM 341, 4 March 1966.

> build small, personally loyal, bypass mechanisms with which to carry out policy on those matters of overwhelming high-level interest. Increasingly in recent years, the White House has chosen the latter route.[85]

F. COMMUNICATION

Without communication there could be no bureaucracy, no delegation, no Department of State. Communication is the process through which orders, information necessary to decisionmaking, and advice are transmitted from a decision point to other parts of the organization. It is also the process that returns to the decisionmaker information about the quality of his prior decisions (feedback). It is a process that flows up, down and laterally throughout the structure, travelling in numerous modes and channels.

> Since the flow of information is the life blood of the Department, decisions concerning the information flow are, in fact, basic decisions on how the Department will be organized and how its operations will be conducted.[86]

It is too commonly assumed that the communications network consists of the formal hierarchical channels established for information flows. In reality the formal channels are only a small part of the whole network in a functioning organization. The organizational chart may not-at-all depict the actual functional structure of an organization; however, a mapping of the true communications network would reveal an extraordinary power structure within and beyond the ordinary organization.

> No matter how elaborate a system of formal communications is set up in the organization, this system will always be supplemented by formal channels. Through these informal channels will flow information, advice, and even orders.[87]

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[85] Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 73.

[86] Wiley, op. cit., p. 4.

[87] Herbert A. simon, op. cit., p. 160.

The informal communications network is usually of overall benefit to the organization, as it frequently can disseminate information much faster than the formal structure. It often appears to have channels with almost infinite capacity. In designing a policymaking system, however, the drawbacks in the informal network must be considered. The information passed is not always accurate, as rumor and gossip get the same high priority as fact. If the channels in the formal structure are not explicit or do not have adequate capacity, primary information flows may be halted or rerouted through the informal network, changing the actual system of relationships in the decision process.[88] Knowledge is power in a large organization, and should certainly be treated that way in the design of a policymaking system.

Information flow in the Department of State is an acute problem because of the ambiguous power structure in foreign affairs management, which is so overextended laterally and layered vertically that the decision process moves sluggishly, at best.[89]

> A new Under Secretary of State discovers that a routine cable--the kind that Under Secretaries are not supposed to see--on the Food for Peace Program has received 27 clearances before being sent out. No one is able to convince him that 27 different people need to agree to the dispatch of such a message.[90]

It was emphasized in the first chapter that bureaucratic responsiveness in the area of foreign affairs is a necessity for the Chief Executive. But as Campbell points out:

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[88] Ibid., pp. 157-162.

[89] Campbell, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

[90] Holbrooke, op. cit., p. 71.

> Communication within and between departments is time-consuming and imprecise, and it is nearly impossible to change ingrained outlooks and procedures. Because the system is difficult to manage and hard to rely on, a modern President is tempted to bypass it completely and develop his own more informal methods of decision.[91]

The current President has done just this, and, in this writer's opinion, has compounded the communications problem severely by isolating and bypassing the seventh floor, and thereby removing much of the Department's raison d'être.[92]

It is clear to this writer that any design of a policymaking system for foreign affairs must pay careful heed to matching an appropriate communications network with the desired structure of relationships. The formal information channels must be well-defined, comprehensive and broad enough to handle a large volume of priority traffic. The design must take into consideration the formation of an informal network, and insure that there exists no ambiguity in decision points, or power relationships which might be realigned by the efficacy of informal communications. Finally, numerous lateral coordinations and unnecessary vertical layering must not be allowed to impede the information flow.

The communication system must provide a number of formal services to the organization of the area of management information. It must furnish a wide range of high quality information in its daily dissemination of message traffic, memoranda and other paper flow. It must serve as the organizational memory, necessitating a highly flexible storage

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[91] Campbell, "What Is To Be Done," op. cit., p. 82.

[92] See discussions of the NSC system in Chapter 1 and the NSC relationship with PARA in Chapter 2.

and retrieval system for records, reports and other multiple data files. The system must be discriminatory in serving the user, neither inundating an individual with unneeded paper flow nor isolating him by providing too little information.

Today's technology makes such selective and flexible processes possible through well-tested and proven computerized information handling systems.[93] Most of the necessary computer hardware is already available within the Department of State, and has been for some time.[94] Preliminary design of several important information subsystems was completed in 1967.[95] The writer feels that this work could be used to develop subsystems ready for implementation within six months. The quality of present-day foreign policy decisions should not be constrained at the outset by archaic nineteenth century administrative procedures.

Implicit in information flow is the necessary feedback to the decision points; consequently, the communications system must provide adequate channel capacity for feedback. Multiple channels are required to carry both the immediate feedback necessary for short term policy review and revision, and the even more important "learning feedback" which is directed toward major policy analyses and improvement of policymaking processes.

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93 Gilbert Burck, The Computer Age, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers) 1964, pp. 2-25.

94 Based on writer's personal survey and evaluation of Department of State's facilities, conducted 24-28 January, 1972, and summarized in a memorandum to Mr. James Ennis, Director, Methods and Systems Staff, 2 February 1972.

95 Department of State report, "A Modern Information System for the Department of State," prepared by the Substantive Information Systems Program Staff, now defunct.

Finally, the system must look outward in its efforts to acquire information and knowledge. It should procure and store pertinent data from a number of external sources, supplemental to normal in-house research and collection capabilities.

The communication system, as the policymaking system, should be in a continuous state of evolution, advancing and improving capabilities as new concepts and technologies permit.

G. SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY AND LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT

At this point in the discussion, most of the major characteristics of the model have been covered. To summarize, the proposed policymaking system is to be qualitative in character, incorporate explicit designs for intuitive or inductive decisionmaking, employ advanced communications system design, and be a truely integrated foreign affairs system. Not yet developed is a way to avoid the inflexibility with which the CASP and PARA systems respond to change, causing much of their product to be ignored. Additionally, a desirable system must have the ability to restructure itself and evolve with time.

A policymaking system, to be useful over time, must have the flexibility to update policies and plans quickly when major environmental changes take place. As explained in Chapter II, the CASP may be as much as eighteen months out-of-date when it takes effect at the start of the fiscal year. The document becomes rigid, however, because the Country Team is already deeply involved in planning for the period two years in the future. Rather than to update immediately with changes in specific policy, the concept is to review and rewrite annually the entire country plan. The model proposed below should alleviate the problem.

Three elements are important to insure flexibility. First the system must have continuous update and revision capabilities, and discard the concept of total annual planning. Ceasing the annual drudgery of rewriting the entire country plan should free FSO's to concentrate on the specific issues which warrant close attention and revision, thereby improving the quality of their efforts. The possibility that such an approach would be less effective in identifying those issues that surface through the CASP approach does exist, but the writer contends that the reduction in work load will, in reality, facilitate more frequent and comprehensive reviews than previously were possible.

Secondly, the proposed system offers a procedure for developing goals, objectives and courses of action, identifying or creating a number of feasible alternatives for each, and analytically selecting the preferable ones. Such a process should remove some of the constraints on creativity within the Department.

Thirdly, there are possible situations for which contingency planning is essential. When a change in the environment is predictable with a high probability, a plan should be made. When a major change in the environment is less predictable but the consequences of being caught unprepared are costly, the principal contingencies should be considered. A flexible policymaking system should identify these cases and develop necessary plans.

The policymaking system also must provide for a long term view of its capacity and capabilities, and change over time in order to produce the best possible decisions. This capability of the system to grow and change requires continuous processes of redesign, development and

implementation. Part of this concept is referred to by Dror as "planning the planning system" and draws heavily on the "learning feedback" capacities of the policymaking structure. Learning feedback permits the system to improve itself on the basis of its experience,[96] and is based on detailed analyses of system outputs over a period of time. Since the activities of learning feedback are related to "think tank" concepts in their requirements for detailed study and creativity, the writer feels that they should be performed by a staff which is somewhat removed from day-to-day crisis management and time constraints.

The Macomber Task Force on Management Evaluation Systems included a similar analysis capability in their proposed Management Evaluation Group (MEG).[97] Implementation of the Task Force XII recommendations, however, struck that portion of the proposal, leaving only the standard inspection and audit functions under the Office of the Inspector General.[98]

Such are the characteristics of the proposed policymaking system. The following chapter presents a conceptual model that incorporates the functions so strongly advocated in this chapter.

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[96] Dror, op. cit., pp. 161, 193-196.

[97] "Diplomacy for the 70's," op. cit., pp. 529-530. The proposed "Policy and Program Evaluation Staff" was strongly objected to by the Department's Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC) because of the fear that administrative personnel, untrained in "substantive" matters, would be telling experienced diplomats how to make foreign policy. The author was a member of S/PC at that time, and followed the situation's progress.

[98] Department of State, Management Reform Bulletin No. 25, "The Evaluation Process: Office of the Inspector General," dated 6 July 1971.

IV. POLICYMAKING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: A GENERAL MODEL

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

1. Overview of Policymaking

Chapter III contained descriptions of seven characteristics the writer believes should be incorporated into a policymaking system for foreign affairs. In this chapter it is the writer's purpose to design a policymaking process which incorporates these characteristics. The model is a prescriptive one, proposing a preferred organization of elements and phases into stages of policymaking which, in the aggregate, form the policymaking process.

Four stages have been identified in this process model: 1) system design, development and control; 2) policy formulation; 3) policy implementation; and 4) policy operations. The policy formulation, implementation and operations stages incorporate those elements of foreign policymaking that the Foreign Service Officer recognizes as "substantive;"[99] therefore, these three stages have been termed the "substantive management" stages. The system design, development and control stage incorporates those phases which Dror calls "policymaking on how to make policy," as well as some of the "post-policymaking" phases.[100] This stage is concerned with the policymaking system, its initial design, and its ability to grow and change. The description

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[99] The political and general economic fields are known by FSOs as "substantive" fields of diplomacy. See John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1969, p. 141.

[100] Dror, op. cit., p. 163.

of the policymaking process will concentrate on the development of each of these four stages and the phases and principal elements contained in them.

One way of looking at the stages of policymaking is to observe the constraints on their activities. The three substantive management stages fall into a simple pattern. Chart 2 shows these three stages as concentric circles, where each ring acts as a set of constraints for those activities within its perimeter.[101] The policy formulation stage, shown in the outer ring, contains the most general phases of identifying key issues and determining policy goals and objectives. It is at this stage of the process where those pressures external to the system have the greatest influence. This stage, in turn, establishes the set of policy objectives which act as the bounds for program development in the implementation stage. In the center of the chart are policy operations, the most constrained activities of the entire process. In this stage the managerial tasks of achieving efficiency and economy are emphasized, and little latitude exists for resource trade-offs within the tight operational guidelines.[102]

Although the circular representation of constraints can show the substantive management stages, it cannot show the relationship of the system design, development and control stage to those three. Chart

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[101] This depiction of the substantive management stages was adapted from Prof. H. Paul Ecker's chart of the management cycle, developed at the Navy Management Systems Center, Monterey.

[102] A description similar to this may be found in Robert N. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University) 1965, p. 19.


POLICYMAKING PROCESS
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
FORMULATION STAGE
Identifying Key Issues
Determining Goals and Objectives
Scientific
Economic
IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
Develop Policy Programs
Within Given Objectives
Technological
Political/External
(Foreign Governments
International Organizations)
OPERATIONS STAGE
Systems Analysis
Program Analysis
Operations Analysis
Specific Constraints
Mixes Constraints
General Constraints
Efficiency
Economy
Input Oriented
Social
Political/Domestic
(Public, Congress, Elites)
Objective Oriented
Cultural
Historical
Goal Oriented
Legal
(Statutory)

Chart 2

3 gives a better overview of the entire policymaking process, showing the principal relationships among the four stages and the phases within each stage.

The system design, development and control stage is designed to have a unifying force on the overall system. Its elements monitor the functions of the system at all stages, evaluate the quality of its output, and re-design those elements that do not perform in the preferred manner. It is this stage that gives the system the flexibility to grow and develop over time.

The policy formulation stage incorporates those phases of strategic planning noted by Professor Ecker:

> In the strategic planning process we are concerned with deciding on organizational objectives [goals] in terms of the broad policies on the acquisition, use and disposition of these resources. We are first concerned with choosing objectives and second with the formulation of long or short range plans on how to achieve the objectives.[103]

Allocation of scarce resources is taken into account at the highest conceptual level, and the goals and objectives developed here are for the foreign affairs community, not just the Department of State.

"In the implementation process, our concern is with the development of programs within the given objectives."[104] This description of the implementation stage is somewhat different from the common useage of the term, ascribing somewhat more decisionmaking latitude to those charged with getting programs from the conceptual to the operating level.

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[103] From lecture entitled "Management II," prepared by H. Paul Ecker for the Defense Management Systems Course, dated 14 October 1970.

[104] Ibid.

POLICYMAKING SYSTEM Chart 3



Finally, the operations stage takes programs which have been implemented and operates them as efficiently and effectively as possible. Data from these operations are collected over a period of time and become a principal source of information for development of learning feedback for system control.

The following sections will describe in detail the phases of the four policymaking stages. To assist the reader in following this development, the succeeding charts will be keyed to Chart 3; and a miniature Chart 3 will appear on each blow-up, indicating the phase being discussed.

2. System Design, Development and Control

Although the functions involved in centralized design and coordination of the policymaking system are termed a "stage," they actually are integrated throughout the formulation, implementative and operational stages of the policymaking process. The three phases of this stage, system design, system development and system control, are shown on Chart 3 to the left of the vertical broken line. Their expanded diagrams are found on Charts 4, 5 and 6.

It is the writer's opinion that the conceptual design of a policymaking system for foreign affairs has been almost totally neglected in the past decade's efforts to develop a foreign affairs programming system. As was discussed at length in Chapter II, there is no underlying body of theory for the PARA system; and no uniform design requirements for PARA must be met by the regional bureaus. The writer further noted in his research that little effort has been made by the Department to take advantage of major advances in the state of international relations theory and methodologies, as well as technological advances in

Chart 4

POLICYMAKING SYSTEM DESIGN

Specialized Educational Development Programs

Global Planning and Resource Guidance

Implementation Feedback

Formulation Feedback

Develop General Design Concept

Develop Specific Design Criteria

Policymaking System Design Guidance

Operational Evaluation Feedback

Long-Range External Research

Creative Study and Analysis

Methods and Systems Research

data handling and manipulation. These elements should have been taken into account with in a policymaking phase devoted to conceptual design and re-design of the system.

One important area of research that has major implications for system design is that of organizational behavior patterns. Modern organization theory now regards such studies as essential to the development of a structure that gains maximum benefit from the individual's abilities.[105]

The only such study that this writer could find was funded by the State Department's now disbanded Center for International Systems Research, and prepared by Chris Argyris as a paper entitled "Some Causes of Organization Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State."[106] The study met with such in-house resistance that it was withdrawn from the Government Printing Office book store shortly after being released.

Human relations research is only one of the inputs necessary to the design of a foreign affairs policymaking system. In the writer's opinion, creative development of new ideas and approaches is not something that can be prepared by the average planning staff. Such a process requires the meeting of many disciplines; and the staff organization effective in this pursuit should contain managerial and technical talents, as well as the requisite substantive expertise. The writer believes that research is essential into new policy science methodologies and advanced managerial support systems. Information theory and cybernetics should be examined; automated data processing capabilities should

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[105] Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.) 1964, pp. 54-59.

[106] Argyris, op. cit.

be exploited to the fullest; and developments and theories in the new fields of systems analysis and operations research should be carefully examined for their analysis and design applications in policymaking.

In those areas where current theories and technologies do not give the necessary support to foreign affairs policymaking, the writer feels that the Department must initiate and support studies and research. Approaches to this could include funding in-house task force study groups for particular substantive problems, sponsoring no-strings university research efforts in international relations and national security affairs, sabbatical or fellowship programs for select FSO's with universities and private research agencies, and outside contracts in those highly specialized areas where no other recourse is feasible.

The writer believes continuous exposure to new ideas and techniques to be essential for the individual tasked with creating foreign affairs applications of new analytic tools and policymaking methodologies. Additionally, these new ideas must be understood by the senior officials who will be rendering decisions on their adoption; and the key to this understanding is education. The writer sees the need for specialized educational development programs to be instituted over a wide span of levels and durations, from short orientation courses for the senior executives with severe time constraints to full university advanced degree programs for selected junior FSO's. This type of program should allow the junior FSO to develop talents as an innovator and coordinator of new techniques, while maintaining the understanding and support of his seniors.

Between the extremes of brief orientation courses and university programs the writer feels that there should be a range of specialized instruction, designed toward limited objectives of preparing individuals

who will assume policy design or analysis roles. For individuals between assignments or earmarked for policy analysis roles, courses of four to six weeks in length, concentrating on specific talents necessary to his new job, should enhance the incoming officer's abilities and ease his transition to new duties. For those officers already filling a critical assignment, university or FSI extension courses easily could be taught for one hour each day, helping them to develop new abilities. Computer programming, basic probability and statistics, and several other specialties can be taught in one-hour increments on television monitors. A host of high-quality self-study material and correspondence courses are available in these specialties, and would in the writer's opinion, be cost-effective investments for any of the foreign affairs agencies.[107]

The importance of research and education has been stressed in this discussion of system design, but is significant in every aspect of the policymaking system. The tools and methodologies developed in policy research and applicable in all phases of policymaking, and the requisite knowledge for using them and understanding their use is again essential throughout.

Each of the elements and activities discussed above are inputs into the development of a general policymaking system design concept, as shown on Chart 4. From this point, the process introduces the exective planning and resource guidance in order to generate specific design criteria. This global level planning guidance is that statement of foreign policy interests and resource availability that is generated

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[107] The writer developed these opinions in his contacts with the Department over the past year, and made several explicit recommendations in a Memorandum to James Ennis, previously cited.

by the executive branch to guide foreign affairs planning. The type and amount of this guidance is a necessary input for the development of system design criteria, such as specific structural and functional requirements for both global and area planning systems, major elements of the formal communications network, personnel requirements and responsibilities, and the overall time-phased plan for system development. These and other criteria would be organized into system design guidance, which would be transmitted to those decisionmakers and staffs responsible for action.

Once the design guidance is issued, the process of structuring the planning systems begins (Chart 5). The global planning and resource guidance and the system design guidance are the key elements used to structure the global planning system. The process generates procedures for developing area policy and resource guidance from the global guidance. Key decision points are specified; roles of functional specialists are made explicit; and a detailed formal information and feedback network is constructed.

Concurrently, similar procedures are taking place in the development of the area planning systems. At this level, a command and control structure is detailed which incorporates the separate agencies and the Department's functional bureaus into a working team. The interagency effort envisioned in this model is <u>not</u> the IG review arrangement, where loyalties are given first to the individual agencies. This staff will have allegiance to a single decisionmaker, clearly defined channels of communication, and the overall policymaking responsibilities of formulation, implementation and operations.

Chart 5

POLICYMAKING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

Once initial structures are established for global and area planning systems, the next step is to develop a capability for monitoring and modifying these structures, and revising the overall design concept if necessary. Evaluation at this stage concerns itself primarily with system implementation, and will perform detailed monitoring operations in the early periods of planning system functioning. The systems, at this point, are in a flexible state of development, where procedures and techniques may be easily revised. For example, different planning periods or methods of data handling may be tried concurrently in several different regions or countries. As these methods are tested and evaluated, the most effective are standardized throughout the system. The evaluation system is fed more detailed data from all three phases of policymaking, and uses this to further develop the policymaking tools through successive iterations.

Again, the interactive nature of this system development and control phase must not be overlooked. A continuous iterative process of monitoring, evaluation, redesign and implementation is being performed throughout the policymaking system. It is this ongoing process that allows the system to develop and change with its environment, and to approach a preferred level of performance.

3. Policy Formulation Stage

The multiple functions performed in the policy formulation stage are detailed on Charts 7, 8 and 9. Foreign policy formulation begins at the highest Executive level of government with the generation of strategic planning guidance by the President and his advisors. Chart 7 does not do justice to the myriad pressures weighing on the Chief Executive in this process; the reader should receive a better appreciation for these external influences from the circular projection on

Chart 6

POLICYMAKING SYSTEM CONTROL
Planning Methodology
Formulation Phase
Implementation Phase
Feedback
Operational Effectiveness Feedback
Monitor and Modify System Implementation
Routinize System Operations
Continued System Evaluation Process
Feedback to General Design Phase

Chart 7

POLICY FORMULATION STAGE
(EXECUTIVE LEVEL)

Chart 2. The President must synthesize these outside forces with his own desires and formulate a set of general policy goals. Using these goals as a guide, the President, with assistance from such key officials as the Secretary of State, Director of OMB, his special assistant for NSA, and others, will develop his strategic planning and resourece guidance.

There are two key items implicit in the above discussion that require elaboration. First is the relationship of the presidential advisory role to an ongoing policymaking system. It was explained in Chapter II that one of the outcomes of the task force reports was tacit recognition of the durability of the current NSC system in the formulation and management of foreign policy. In the opinion of this writer, granting such extensive powers to the personal advisory staff of the President is an error for a number of reasons. Although the foreign affairs bureaucracy is at present unresponsive to the Executive will, this writer feels that the majority of talent is there. Furthermore the Chief Executive need not become more isolated from reality than is already unavoidable.[108] It is far better to make the supreme effort required to restructure the bureaucracy than to abrogate policymaking powers to the severely limited capabilities and capacities of the NSC staff.

The second item that must be emphasized is the relationship of fiscal constraints to all levels of the policymaking process. Budgetary restrictions have been studiously ignored in the foreign affairs

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[108] For a discussion of this "isolation" of the Chief Executive, see Reedy, op. cit.

policymaking concepts of the past decade as was described in the CASP and PARA discussions in Chapter II, yet it is impossible to carry out any valid analysis of policy options at any conceptual level if this initial criterion for feasibility is not considered. The current reasoning that policies can be effectively formulated in the absence of controls over their implementation is, to the writer's mind, specious. Fiscal guidance in initial policy formulation and budgetary constraints in the analysis of alternative policy objectives are, in the writer's opinion, essential elements to arrival at a preferred policy decision under conditions of limited resources.[109]

One final point on this phase of policy formulation concerns the necessary flexibility of the issued guidance. Feedback from the subsequent phases of formulation may indicate the necessity for changes in either policy or resource constraints. The policymaking system should allow for interaction and generation of revisions in guidelines when warranted.

The next phase in policy formulation is the detailed analysis of policy and resource guidance to identify the key issues and goals (Chart 8). Different issues will be found in varying stages of development, and the system should have the flexibility to begin the analysis at any point. The Chief Executive frequently will state specific policy goals, and even ocasionally will formulate explicit short term objectives he wishes to see implemented. When the guidance is more in the form of a general concept or attitude, however, it becomes necessary

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[109] The writer is not alone in this contention, and directs the reader to the discussion of resource allocation in Chapter III.

Chart 8

POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Global Planning and Resource Guidance

Development or Revision of Policy Goals

Identification of Key Policy Issues

Develop Multiple Alternative Objectives

Feedback From Implementation

Request Revised Objectives

Set Of Alternative Objectives

Analysis

Feedback from Analysis Objectives

Not Feasible/Preferable

Policymaking System Implementation and Operations

Analytic Techniques and Tools

for long range goals to be developed by an analysis staff; and a number of alternative objectives must be generated and examined.

Important in the search for preferred alternatives when making policy decisions is the support of policymaking creativity through emphasis on development of a number of alternative policy objectives in support of each goal. These objectives are then subjected to an analysis process in order to determine feasibility and preferability of their selection. Continuous throughout this development of the preferred set of policy objectives is feedback to all earlier phases of policy formulation. If objectives are generally infeasible for budgetary reasons, additional resources may be requested. If the problem lies in acceptability of the objective within the planning environment, requests for elaboration on policy guidance may be forwarded.

As explained in the preceding chapter, analysts should have high quality substantive information which is available immediately on request. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques will be used throughout this stage of policy formulation, and this writer sees the need for analytic tools and requisite data bases in easily retrievable storage systems, such as computerized on-line facilities.

Once the set of feasible, preferable policy objectives has been developed, this product is then submitted for final approval by Department principals. Such approval is justification for the next phase of policymaking, the implementation phase, to begin.

4. Policy Implementation Stage

The implementation phase of the policymaking system carries form the specific statement of policy objectives through the development and activation of programs designed to achieve those objectives (Charts 10 and 11).

Chart 9

POLICY FORMULATION STAGE

Information Storage and Retrieval System

Decisionmaking By Principals

Analytic Tools and Techniques

Feasible and Preferable Objectives

Approved?

No

Yes

Set of Alternative Objectives

Assess Feasibility of Objectives

Set of Feasible Objectives

Assess Prefer-ability of Objectives

Statement of Policy Objectives

No Feasible Objectives
Request Guidance

No Preferable Objectives
Request Guidance

Develop New Objectives

The development of alternative programs for a stated objective depends on whether the statement of that objective is operational or more abstract. It has been the writer's experience that policy objectives are frequently narrow and operationally oriented, with the objective statement and program statement almost one in the same. If the objective calls for "training a fixed number of co-op managers in Country A," then the program must be one for training co-op managers. If the objective is more general, such as "to increase grain yeilds by five per cent in Country B," than a range of possible programs could be effective. It is possible, in the latter case, that the optimal arrangement might include a combination of programs, such as planting a fixed acreage with improved seeds, supporting research and testing of special grain varieties, agricultural education programs and distribution of production credits. The selection of one or all of these alternatives is an analytical process that must assess first feasibility and then preferability of programs.

The point must be made that this development of alternative program possibilities, and the assessment of and selection from this set of alternatives, can be no less important than the selection of policy objectives in the formulation stage. The strategic level analysis of goals and objectives, and the cost figures generated to support this analysis, cannot reflect accurate amounts.[110] The degree of uncertainty at the strategy level renders these figures useful only in the relative sense of selecting among alternatives at that same level. The costing of specific programs such as the agricultural programs mentioned above, that are to be implemented should be much

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[110] See Ecker, op. cit.

Chart 10

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Area/Functional Planning and Resource Consultation

Information Storage and Retrieval System

Feedback From Operations
Request Alternative Courses of Action

Statement of Policy Objectives

Development of Alternative Courses of Action

Set of Alternative Programs

Analysis

Feedback From Analysis
Action Programs Not Feasible/Preferable

Policymaking System Implementation and Operation

Analytic Techniques and Tools

exacting, and errors can be quite costly in forcing reallocation of resources to cover unforeseen cost overruns. The need for careful analysis and cost estimation is equally as great in getting programs to the operating level as it is in the initial selection of policy objectives.[111]

In Chapter III the point was made that implementation of policy programs should, if at all possible, be carried out at the Country Team level. It is clear that the initial stages of implementation, where program options are developed and evaluated and preferable programs are selected, will be characterized by much interaction among area, functional and country staffs. Once the final decisions are made concerning which programs to institute where, the writer feels that the Country Teams should be best qualified to carry through the programs. Familiarity with the local situation, personal contacts of CT members, formal authority of the Chief-of-Mission and continuity of staffing are all advantages of decentralizing policy implementation and operations to the CT level.

Creating a particular program's structure in a host country requires all of the above areas of expertise and more. Since program operation can vary from a one-man negotiating function up to a major educational, agricultural or contracted construction effort, program activation can be quite a complex task. It may be necessary to develop specialized processes or techniques in one of these or other fields. It will surely be necessary to secure and train personnel in varied specialty fields and supervise program development and resource flow.

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[111] Ibid.

Chart 11

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

Information Storage and Retrieval System

Analytic Tools and Techniques

Develop Techniques and Processes

Set of Alternative Programs

Assess Feasibility, Preferability of Programs

Selected Policy Programs

Create or Modify Program Structure

No Program Feasible/ Preferable Request Guidance

Secure and Train Personnel

This writer feels that it would be must easier to augment the Country Team with the requisite specialists than to dispatch a special project unit to the host country in the semi-autonomous role of implementing foreign policy programs.

5. Policy Operations Stage

Once implementation has progressed to the point where major revisions in program structure and activities are no longer being made, operational guidelines can be established and the operations stage begins (Charts 12 and 13). Operations are the ends toward which the policy implementation functions were directed, and the routine conduct of these activities should be the most effective approach the manager could find for attaining a particular policy objective.[112] The whole purpose of the "formulation--implementation--operations" process flow is to retain the policymaking continuity from initial concept through to activity, attempting to avoid faulty suboptimization while dividing the policymaking processes into segments that can be managed effectively.[113]

In the operations stage, constraints are specific; and managerial efforts are primarily directed toward achieving economy and efficiency in the use of resources. Fixed operational procedures are established and conduct of the various program activities becomes routinized. Analysis is more highly quantified and specific, and stress is placed on collection of operational data and reporting. Where in the earlier

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[112] Ibid.

[113] See section C, this chapter, for a discussion of the suboptimization--criterion problem.

Chart 12

POLICY OPERATIONS STAGE

Chart 13

POLICY OPERATIONS STAGE

Storage and Update

Information Storage and Retrieval System

Analytic Tools and Techniques

Data Collection and Reports

Assess Efficiency and Effectiveness of Operations

Select Preferable Operational Modes

Continued Data Collection and Reporting

Policymaking System Implementation and Operations

phases of the policymaking process the emphasis was on ideas and concepts, the operations phase is primarily concerned with the economic or efficient achievement of tasks. The manager's analysis capability assists him in selecting the operational modes he finds preferred within his constraint boundaries.

A major operations function that supports all four stages of policymaking is the continued collection and storage of operational data. This data travels through primary feedback channels into the policy analysis functions at all levels, as well as into storage in the information storage and retrieval system. In the policy design and control phase, the data provides the base for "learning feedback," used to evaluate and restructure the overall policymaking system. At other points it becomes the immediate feedback input into analysis of program alternatives and even supports the more esoteric analyses conducted in the formulation phase. This data collection provides the raw material necessary to feed a dynamic policymaking process, continuously in a state of transition and development.

B. THE MODEL AND REALITY

At this point in the thesis, the writer has examined and critiqued existing systems for policymaking at the Department of State, developed his own characteristics for a preferred policymaking system, and proposed a model of the phases and elements necessary to the policymaking process for the foreign affairs community. Now the obvious question is how does this model relate to the real situation?

The writer believes that this model relates quite well to the situation he has observed over the past year. The reader must understand, however, just what has been presented. First observe what this

model is not. The numerous charts do not define a specific hierarchical, behavioral or functional organization structure. Neither does the model represent an algorithm or methodology for policymaking.

The model does show phases and elements that the writer feels are essential to the development of a preferred policymaking process, a process that operates in such a manner that the preferred alternatives (goals, objectives, programs) are developed and selected. The model proposes elements and phases of a process that will develop a policy-making structure and methodologies. The model offers the elements of a cybernetic process to insure the system continuously grows and adapts to its environment.

A policy develops from its initial concept through to policy action in the three substantive management stages: formulation, implementation and operations. At a given moment, the formulation of policy goals and objectives may be taking place at the Department's seventh floor level, implementation may be in process at the regional bureau level, and policy operations may be conducted by a country team. However, this is not the only case. The Under Secretary of State may be performing in all three stages simultaneously. He may be formulating goals and objectives for a Department manpower reduction, implementing a Presidential directive to establish a commission on narcotics traffic, and operating his own office staff. An ambassador may be involved in policy formulation for his host country or his region, while also implementing and operating other policy objectives and programs. With the proposed model, this same pattern holds at every level.

The proposed process requires analyses to be performed in all three substantive management stages, to assist the policymakers toward valid suboptimizations and the selection of proper criteria for policy

evaluation.[114] The CASP system required a rigid methodology for policy selection at the country level, without commensurate prior regional and global level analyses. As explained in Chapter II, the criteria for the lower level suboptimizations could not be effectively aggregated into regional plans, as the constraints had not been given at the outset. The proposed model anticipates and guides the development of methodologies in each of the three substantive management stages, offering a degree of homogeneity to policy development through these stages. The writer foresees that his process would cause most strategic planning (formulation) mechanisms to be established at the senior executive or seventh floor and regional bureau levels, most implementative mechanisms at regional bureau and country team levels, and most operations control mechanisms at the country or mission level.

Much of the function of the proposed system design, development and control stage would likely be performed by an analysis staff located at the seventh floor level, and removed from the hassle of day-to-day operations. This would rule out the current Planning and Coordination Staff and probably require development of a new staff entity at that level. Some of the system development and control functions could be assumed by analysis staffs at regional and country levels, but the writer anticipates that these staffs would be more intimately involved in the current policy analysis phases of policymaking. This new seventh floor staff would take on more the aspect of a "think tank," and concern itself with the development and advancement of the policymaking system. It has been one of the writer's principal objectives

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[114] See the criterion discussion in section C of this chapter.

to show the need for and develop a concept of this system-oriented stage, performing the function of "policymaking on how to make policy."

The purpose of the model, then, is to describe (prescribe) a process which contains elements and phases of policymaking that the writer considers essential to development of a preferred system, elements which are not always considered in the structuring of such systems. The model then becomes a conceptual frame for the development of the specific organizational structure and analysis methodologies.

C. EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT

1. Concept

Policymaking in foreign affairs is an interactive process which continually involves choice among alternatives. The alternatives may be strategic policy goals, objectives to achieve those goals, or programs designed to attain the objectives. Whatever the level of aggregation, the general problem of choice is essentially the same.

> In order to choose among alternatives, a way to estimate or predict the various consequences of their selection must exist. This may be as elementary as calling on the intuition of a single expert, but the more formal process of using a model or set of models usually leads to better results.[115]

In addition to the requirement to estimate the consequences of alternatives, there must be a way to relate or compare them, a "criterion" for the construction of an"effectiveness scale."

A third element, which may or may not be incorporated into the above, is a "standard" to measure from. The standard can give important properties to the effectiveness scale, depending on how it is

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[115] E.S. Quade, "Principles and Procedures of Systems Analysis," in Quade and W.I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation) 1968, p. 42.

applied. It can require a minimum level of performance for each alternative (survival level), offer a performance target or goal, or simply express the level of past performance for purposes of comparison.

In the writer's research, most descriptions of effectiveness measurement were built around hardware examples, in which the effectiveness scales were constructed of common physical units that provided their own implicit standards, such as miles per hour, rounds per minute, lethal radius and so on. It is the writer's opinion that in policy-making the standards must be made explicit, due to both the ambiguous character of some of the measures and the possible invalid useage of certain standards. As Dror's example shows, there is:

> ...the possibility that, despite higher achievements than in the past, the organization may be worse off when evaluated by significant outside standards.... A hospital that how heals 70 per cent of patients with a certain disease, and that healed only 45 per cent in the past, may have become less efficient if in the past only 48 per cent of the patients could possibly be cured, but now, with modern medicine, 85 per cent could be.[116]

Before this discussion of effectiveness measurement proceeds, there are a number of terms that should be defined.

> Model: A model is a representation of reality which abstracts the features of the situation relevant to the question being studied.[117]
>
> The role of the model in systems analysis is to provide a way to obtain cost and performance estimates for each alternative.[118]

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[116] Dror, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

[117] E. S. Quade, "Introduction," in Quade and Boucher, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

[118] Quade, op. cit., p. 42.

Criterion: A criterion is a rule...for ranking the alternatives in order of desirability and indicating the most promising.[119]

Effectiveness Scale: Scale indicating degrees of achievement, related to a particular criterion.

Effectiveness: Position on the effectiveness scale assigned to each alternative.[120]

Standard: Tool for appraising or grading the ascertained level of effectiveness.[121]

The writer believes that adaptation of the above definitions to the evaluation process in policymaking removes much of the ambiguity inherent in the unquantifiable aspects of choosing among alternatives. The criterion is used to develop an effectiveness scale. The degrees of predicted or actual achievement for each alternative are expressed on the scale as that alternative's level of effectiveness. Then the standard is applied to assist in identifying which, if any, of the alternatives might be preferred.

An example might aid to clarify the above process. The long-range goal is to raise the literacy rate in Country X by five per cent in a five-year period. One of the selected objectives is to reduce the primary school dropout rate by ten per cent over the next two years. Alternative programs being considered are: 1) Construct additional classrooms on existing schools; 2) Construct additional schools in outlying areas; 3) provide additional teachers for outlying areas; and 4) provide personal incentives (tuition programs, tax reductions) for families who keep their children in school.

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[119] Quade, op. cit., p. 12.

[120] Effectiveness and effectiveness scale adapted from: L. D. Attaway, "Criteria and the Measurement of Effectiveness," in Quade and Boucher, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

[121] Adapted from: Dror, op. cit., p. 58.

In this example, the criterion will be the primary school drop-out rate, using grades one through six. The effectiveness scale will measure this drop-out rate. The effectiveness of each alternative will be determined by the predicted/actual drop-out rate resulting from imployment of that alternative alone. The standard will be the planned target of ten percent reduction in primary school drop-out rate over a two-year period.

The two principal uses of effectiveness measures in this example are to decide which alternative programs to employ and to evaluate those programs once they are operational. The writer realizes that there may be interactions among the alternatives being considered. The combination of construction and teacher training may together provide a much higher return than the sum of the two applied separately, or one might be a constraint upon the other. These are considerations that must be weighed by the policy analyst when he is formulating his model, and he may take them into account at the risk of the model becoming too complex to manipulate.

The preceding point requires the clarification of two concepts: first, what is a model; and secondly, what is the effect of the iterative nature of the process on selection of alternatives.

A model was defined earlier as "a representation of reality which abstracts the features of the situation relevent to the question being studied." In this definition there is no requirement that a model be particularly mathematical, computerized, or even analytical.[122] A

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[122] A comprehensive introduction to types of models may be found in: R. D. Specht, "The Nature of Models," Quade and Boucher, op. cit., pp. 211-227.

scenario may be a model as well as a set of differential equations. One model presented in this section is that primary school drop-out rate in Country X may be influenced by the four alternative programs being considered. As the analysis proceeds, each of these alternative programs must be costed by constructing a "cost model," which will examine the amounts of resources necessary to accomplish the proposed tasks. (Costs are usually interpreted as opportunities foregone or "opportunity costs.") To summarize, a number of models may be used by a policy analyst in reaching a decision. The only difference advocated in the evaluation process being outlined is that the analyst make the model explicit rather than implicit.

The second concept to be expanded is the nature of the iterative process in selection of alternatives. Going back to the example, it was mentioned that there was a possibility of interaction among the alternatives, with the possibility of producing some hybrid combination. One possibility not mentioned was that data collection might cause a previously unconsidered alternative to surface. A survey of the rural areas, to gather data for evaluating the four proposed alternatives, might show that a major impediment to keeping children in school is the need for their addition to the farm labor force during critical planting and harvest periods. If the school year presently includes these periods, a new alternative might be the revision of the class schedule to conform to the needs of the people. Both examples, the construction of a hybrid alternative and the addition of a new alternative, could be incorporated into the model; and the new set of alternatives could be evaluated. The same interation might have shown one

of the other alternatives, e.g. tax incentives to be of negligible value. This alternative, then would be dropped from the model.

2. Criteria

Now that the subject of effectiveness measurement has been introduced and the principal terms defined and explained, a closer look should be taken at the difficulties and complexities of establishing measurement criteria.

> Ideally we should choose that course of action which, with available resources, maximizes something like the "satisfaction" of an individual, the profits of a firm, the "military worth" of the military establishment, or the "well being" of a group.... Then we would pick the policy that promised to yield the most satisfaction, the most profits, the most military worth, or the most well being.... We do not have the ability to translate outcomes into such terms. In practical problem-solving, therefore, we have to look at some "proximate" criterion which serves to reflect what is happening to satisfaction or military worth. Actual criteria are the practicable substitutes for the maximization of whatever we would ultimately like to maximize.[123]

As Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean point out, analysis cannot be expressed in terms of esoteric values. The criteria, to be useable, must be expressed operationally or in some workable manner. Often this cannot be done at the level or degree of complexity of the problem. Big problems, then, must be broken into several small problems; and some of the variables must be held constant in order to make the problem manageable. Hitch and McKean go on to say:

> It is inevitable that decision-making be broken into pieces. The division is almost necessarily along hierarchical lines, some of the broader policy choices being made by high level officials or groups, others being delegated to lower levels.

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[123] Hitch and McKean, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

> Similarly, analyses must be piece-meal, since it is impossible for a single analysis to cover all problems of choice simultaneously in a large organization.[124]

The above discussion introduces the concepts expressed by the two terms suboptimization and aggregation, and opens a new area of possible difficulty in the evaluation problem.

Attaway defines suboptimization as "...fixing certain characteristics that might, in fact, vary...."[125] In terms of the earlier example, the goal of raising Country X's literacy rate was broken into several manageable pieces, one of which was the reduction of primary school drop-out rate. Optimization of this objective is a suboptimization of the larger goal. The goal itself is a suboptimization of a functionally vague concept such as education or quality of life. Going the other direction, our objective was divided into programs, such as school and classroom construction. Once adopted, these programs will be further divided into elements, perhaps phasing the classroom construction program by regions or by prioritizing the areas of greatest need.

Suboptimizing to gain understanding and manageability of problems is recognized as a necessary technique. The problem of dividing the goals, objectives or programs, however, becomes quite complex when criteria are considered. Attaway goes on to say:

> Suboptimization permits the design of various components... to be fixed. They can then be represented by a single over-all component...that is, we can "aggregate" components into larger systems. Without this ability to aggregate, we could not study problems embracing many components....[126]

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[124] Ibid.

[125] Attaway, op. cit., p. 63.

[126] Ibid.

The major problem in aggregation is the criteria problem. As various levels of suboptimization are employed, the analyst must continually check to see that the lower level criteria do not conflict with those used in the higher levels of aggregation. As Hitch and McKean stress,

> ...there is a real danger in piecemeal analysis, one whose importance must be reemphasized because it is probably not as widely appreciated as are the difficulties inherent in biting off too big a chunk of the problem. The danger is that the criteria adopted in lower level problems may be unrelated to and inconsistant with the higher level criteria. As mentioned before, proximate criteria have to be used in any case; but since problems must be considered one piece at a time, a whole hierarchy of proximate criteria comes into play, and potential inconsistencies are abundant.[127]

To go back to our example of raising the literacy rate in Country X, it might be faulty to use the number of teachers trained as a criterion, not knowing whether they would go to the areas of need or even stay in the country. In the Republic of Viet Nam in 1965-66, programs to train doctors had little effect on the availability of doctors in the rural areas because, once educated, the doctors remained in the population centers where they received much higher pay for their services.[128]

The problems with criterion selection presented in this section only scratch the surface. Each task facing the policy analyst is unique, and only he can know the many difficulties he will encounter in developing valid measurement criteria. There is extensive literature on the subject, however, and the reader may find it useful to examine the major problem areas encountered by others.[129]

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[127] Hitch and McKean, op. cit., p. 163.

[128] Personal experience as adviser in Viet Nam.

[129] See: Hitch and McKean, op. cit., pp. 158-181; L. D. Attaway, op. cit., pp. 54-80; Dror, op. cit., Ch. 3-6; Quade, op. cit., pp. 35-50.

3. Standards

The treatment here of standards will be brief and geared to the identification of some of the problems that may be met in their selection. A standard was defined earlier as a "tool for appraising or grading the ascertained level of effectiveness." It provides an anchor point for the effectiveness scale, a point to measure from, and in some cases a minimum acceptable level or "survival quality" measure.

Dror identifies seven main standards for grading the quality of policymaking: "(1) post quality; (2) quality of other systems; (3) desired quality; (4) professional standards of quality; (5) survival quality; (6) planned quality; and (7) optimal quality."[130] The writer does not intend to examine each of these standards as the breakdown is arbitrary and they are discussed in detail in Dror's book. Dror contends that the only valid standard in all cases is "optimal quality," and uses his argument as a lead-in to his "optimal model" concept.[131] It is the writer's contention that selection of a standard has most of the possible pitfalls found in criterion selection, and that any of the above categorizations may be valid or invalid depending on the particular case.

In the literacy rate example presented earlier, the criterion for measuring attainment of the goal was "literacy rate," and the standard was a desired quality of five per cent improvement in five years. If research shows that literacy rate is climbing already at a rate equivalent to or in excess of the standard, then the standard may be faulty. This exposes a problem of setting standards that would be met with or without implemented programs.

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[130] Dror, op. cit., p. 58.

[131] Ibid., pp. 67-69.

Other problems may be found in the areas of standards which reflect improvement over time or advancements over existing systems. A particular program may show great improvement over previous efforts, but still remain below survival quality. Dror hypothesizes a case where:

> ...although an air defense system has tripled its capacity to intercept enemy missiles from x to 3x, it may now be in more danger than ever if, in the meantime the enemy's attack capacity has increased from x-n to 3x + m.[132]

Standards should be selected along with the criteria, and both used to construct the effectiveness scale. Both are subject to changes which may be initiated by the questioning and reexamining aspects of the iterative analysis process. Standards, as criteria, are not immutable in the evaluation process, and may change on the basis of evidence that they are or have become invalid. In the end, it is the policy analyst who must monitor the dynamics of several levels of criteria and standards, and insure that necessary changes are made.

4. Cost-Effectiveness

Since the concept of "cost" was considered to be more familiar to the reader and past experience in foreign affairs programming was concentrated in "costing" alternatives, the writer has focussed the discussion of evaluation on effectiveness measurement. This does not in any way reduce the importance of cost considerations. As pointed out in Chapters II and III, this writer considers the lack of a linkage between cost and effectiveness to be a major shortcoming of past foreign affairs programming efforts. It is the writer's opinion, however, that

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[132] Ibid., p. 29.

much of this linkage difficulty was due to inadequate or non-existant measures of effectiveness. Cost and effectiveness must be brought together to complete the evaluation process.

In comparison of alternatives, there are two principal conceptual approaches: 1) fixed effectiveness, where a specified level of effectiveness is set and the analysis is used to minimize the necessary costs to achieve it; and 2) fixed budget, where for a specified cost the analysis is used to select the alternatives that give the highest effectiveness.[133] The example used throughout this section shows instances where either approach may be used. The standard of ten per cent reduction in primary school drop-out rate may, if considered important enough, be taken as a fixed effectiveness level; and the alternative(s) selected will achieve that standard at the lowest cost. On the other hand, the standard may be used simply as a target, and a fixed budget may be allotted for the purpose. The point to be emphasized is that cost should be related to effectiveness in one of these manners.

It is not the writer's purpose to begin a detailed discussion of how to cost the alternatives being considered. At least one entire volume has been devoted to this subject.[134] The concept of marginal costs should, however, be explained. "Marginal costs are those costs incurred as we make marginal changes in a program."[135] Related to our example of building additional schools in outlying areas of Country X, the marginal costs could be the costs of each additional school; and

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[133] Fisher, op. cit., p. 10.

[134] Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis, Ibid.

[135] Ibid., p. 39.

the commensurate increase in effectiveness achieved by adding each school would be one way a policy analyst could array his data for use by the decisionmaker.

It is the writer's opinion that such an incremental approach to analysis particularly lends itself to foreign policy, and is useable in cases where the decisionmaker's alternatives cannot be related to the same criterion. Take an expanded version of our much-used example. The goal is to raise literacy rate. One objective is lowering primary school drop-out rates. Another might be the expansion of adult education programs to slum areas, with a criterion in terms of numbers who graduate a basic adult education program. Although the criteria for these two objectives are not equivalent, the decisionmaker can view their response to a marginal increase in program funding, and should be better able to make his decision.

This discussion of effectiveness measurement in policy analysis has only scratched the surface. Its purpose has been to support the author's contention that such measures can be applied in an area where the problems being considered cannot be quantified in any direct manner and involve a great deal of subjective judgment. A remark by M. M. Lavin of RAND best expresses the author's feelings at this point.

> No individual or organization can hope to be objective. They can, however, be honest in identifying and displaying their bias. The notion that big decisions can be an automatic consequence of the application of mathematical models, cost-effectiveness analysis, or computer simulation belongs to that dreadful era when science-fiction writers, including some on the editorial page of the N. Y. Times, were heralding the advent of "push-button" warfare (in some instances with the buttons being pushed by computers).[136]

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136 Quoted in Specht, op. cit., p. 221.

D. RETROSPECTION

Having completed a long passage and possibly offending on route some of those persons the writer wanted to encourage, if not help, he wishes to recall his purposes. First, it was his intent to propose a conceptual framework for policymaking in foreign affairs, recognizing that others will supply specific techniques and methodologies.

Secondly, the writer tried to look at the whole of America's foreign affairs, yet keep the perspective of those individuals involved in particular facets of policymaking. The attempt has been to identify and design processes and relationships that must be considered in a future overall system as well as examine the benefits and applications they will have for practicioners at varying levels.

It is the writer's contention that the new frontier for systems analysis is its application to the field of policy sciences and that this frontier will be the most challenging for policymakers and their advisors in decades to come.

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After three decades of intense United States international involvement, a complex community of semi-autonomous governmental agencies has evolved to plan, implement and operate America's foreign affairs. The past ten years have seen several attempts to unify policymaking machinery. This thesis proposes a general model for Presidential foreign policymaking through the Department of State. Historical aspects of the problem are briefly described, followed by an analysis of the current CASP and PARA approaches to foreign affairs planning, decisionmaking, resource management and review. The author then proposes a conceptual model based on essential characteristics of foreign affairs policymaking, which are fashioned into a dynamic four-stage system for substantive management. The thesis concludes with consideration of the measurement of effectiveness as a basis for choosing policies.

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